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THE THEORY OF THE FIRM: INVESTOR
COORDINATION COSTS, CONTROL
PREMIUMS AND CAPITAL
STRUCTURE
WILLIAM J. CARNEY*
I. INTRODUCTION
Business lawyers, both practicing and academic, spend much of their
time and energies dealing with distributional disputes that arise (or may
arise) among investors in firms.I Expenditures of resources on such ques-
* Charles Howard Candler Professor, Emory University Law School. I wish to thank Profes-
sors Howard E. Abrams, Peter H. Aranson, Fred S. McChesney, all of Emory, John C. Coffee, Jr. of
Columbia University, Jonathan R. Macey of Cornell University, Dean Henry G. Manne and Larry
E. Ribstein of George Mason University, Morey W. McDaniel, Esq. of Union Carbide Corporation,
and the participants in the New York University Law School Faculty Workshop and the Emory
Law & Economics Workshop for their helpful comments on earlier drafts of this paper. Thanks are
also due to Victoria Aranow, Emory Law School, 1986, for her assistance on the research for this
paper. The responsibility for the errors that remain rests solely with the author.
1. I have traced the history of shareholder disputes over distributions in fundamental corpo-
rate changes, such as mergers and sales of all of the assets of a corporation, in Fundamental Corpo-
rate Changes, Minority Shareholders, and Business Purposes, 1980 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 69. I have
long believed that much of A. A. Berle's work was concerned not with what we now call agency
costs (and when he called the separation of ownership and control), but with conflicts among co-
investors. Unfortunately, Berle attributed many of these conflicts (or abuses, as he saw them) to
management power, rather than to investor power, all of which he described as "control." Thus,
much of Chapter II, "Regrouping of Rights: Relative Legal Position of Ownership and Control," in
A. BERLE & G. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY (1933), deals with
distributional issues. Chapter III deals with "Powers over the Routing of Earnings as Between
Shares of Stock," and covers such topics as the timing of dividends. Chapter IV deals with "Power
to Alter the Original Contract Rights of Security Holders," and covers charter and statute amend-
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tions only confirm worst suspicions about lawyers: that lawyers earn
their keep by facilitating rent-seeking, and ultimately rent dissipation.2
Those outside the legal profession generally view these "pie-splitting" is-
sues as ex post disputes among investors, which lawyers aid, abet, and
even encourage.
One can view the entire law of equity, with its emphasis on ex post
"fairness" as little more than an attempt to create a doctrinal structure
that allows disappointed participants in firms to renegotiate contracts
through the courts. The entire structure of corporate law governing ma-
jority or dominant shareholders, involving such doctrines (or would-be
doctrines) as "sale of control," "unfairness" in takeout mergers, and the
like, facilitates such renegotiations, or at least provides theories on which
any investor, unhappy with a particular outcome, can base a lawsuit.
This view of what lawyers do is obviously unflattering, and only con-
firms Gilson's characterization of outside views of business lawyers as a
transaction cost, "part of a system of wealth redistribution from clients
to lawyers... ," in which investors are worse off at the end of the trans-
action by the amount both sides have spent on legal counsel.4
ments, which result in "Changes in Relative Position or Risk as Between Participants," and
"Changes in Participation Rights," which are covered in this paper. Chapter VI, "The Legal Posi-
tion of Control," deals with the use of control by dominant investors (through responsive agents) to
self-deal with the firm, and imputes the fiduciary duties of managers to those who control managers,
a relatively new legal concept at the time. Id. at 239. The "sale of control" "problem" appears id. at
243-44. In Chapter VII, "Corporate Powers as Powers in Trust," Berle tried to impose fiduciary
duties on majority owners of firms whenever they exercise their power to dominate firm decisions,
and characterizes control as a "corporate asset." The Berle tradition continues, in a more explicitly
normative setting, in Bayne, The Philosophy of Corporate Control. A Treatise on the Law of Fiduciary
Duty (1986).
2. See, eg., Easterbrook & Fisehel, Corporate Control Transactions, 92 YALE L.J. 698, 711
(1982):
A final reason why the gains from beneficial transactions may depend on unequal division
is that sharing rules may lead to costly attempts to appropriate greater parts of the gains.
The appropriation problem arises because most gain-sharing rules do not produce com-
pletely predictable results-it is difficult to determine the 'fair' price. If all investors are
entitled to a 'fair' share of the bounty, each will find it advantageous to claim as much as
possible and fight for his claim. He would spend as much as a dollar, on the margin, to
claim another dollar of the benefits. It is possible for a substantial part of the gain to be
frittered away, therefore, as claimants attempt to make the argument that they are entitled
to more.
3. "Fairness is an invulnerable position; who is for unfairness? But for lawyers fairness is 'a
suitcase full of bottled ethics from which one freely chooses to blend his own type of justice.'"
Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 2, at 703, n.17 (quoting Stigler, The Law and Economics of Public
Policy: A Plea to the Scholars, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 4 (1972)).
4. Gilson, Value Creation by Business Lawyers: Legal Skills and Asset Pricing, 94 YALE L.J.
239 (1984).
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Gilson has attempted a systematic description of how business lawyers
bring value to a transaction, using the example of the business acquisi-
tion.' In this paper I will argue that the entire exercise of worrying about
distributions among investors is more than a rent-dissipation activity.
One the contrary, it has real efficiency implications that lawyers have not
yet expressed to economists, although many clients may well be aware of
the value of these services. Unlike Gilson, I will focus not on the law-
yer's role in reducing costs facing the firm, but on the nature of the costs
themselves.
A. Purpose of the Paper
In this paper I develop a taxonomy of the general conflicts that can
arise among investors within a firm. I describe them as "coordination
costs," because in part they involve issues of whether the preferences of
multiple investors are so coordinated that the corporate actions selected
are likely to be Pareto superior rather than Kaldor-Hicks efficient.6
In the past many commentators have either confused these costs with
agency costs or assumed them away. Conflicts among investors have
often been confused with management misbehavior, or agency costs, at
least by legal observers.7 The agency-cost literature focuses on the con-
flict between an owner and an agent. The initial examination of the sub-
ject dealt with the conflict between a single manager and an outside
owner (or assumed away any problems associated with multiple owners
of the firm), a useful simplification.8 Only recently has the relationship
between dispersion of ownership and agency costs been explored in some
5. Id.
6. Efficiency may be measured by different criteria. A resource allocation is Pareto optimal
when any movement from it that would make one party better off, leaves another party in a worse
position. Cf Coleman, Efficiency, Utility and Wealth Maximization, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 509, 512-
13 (1980). An allocation is Pareto superior to another if it places no one in a worse position, and if it
improves at least one person's welfare. Id. at 513. Kaldor-Hicks efficiency, on the other hand,
involves trade-offs. A resource allocation is Kaldor-Hicks efficient with respect to another if, and
only if, welfare gains to one group are not exceeded by welfare losses to another.
7. See, e-g., Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon Delaware, 83 YALE L.J.
663, 670 (1974), where the late Professor William L. Cary criticized Delaware law for creating a
"favorable climate" for management by relaxing fiduciary standards and standards of fairness. As
an example of decisions creating a favorable climate for management, he listed Sinclair Oil Co. v.
Levien, 280 A.2d 717 (Del. 1971), a case involving a dispute among shareholders about dividend
levels. For a discussion of this case see infra text accompanying note 99.
8. Jensen & Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership
Structure, 3 J. FIN. EcoN. 305 (1976) (hereinafter Jensen & Meckling).
1987]
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detail.9
This paper relaxes the simplifying assumption of monolithic ownership
and begins the process of examining a richer theory of the firm. A com-
plete theory of the firm must account not ony for conflicts between
agents and principals, but also for conflicts that may exist among co-
owners. These conflicts present a discrete set of costs for the firm, sepa-
rate and apart from agency costs.
The more complete description of coordination costs extends the the-
ory of capital structure to complement, and at the same time to compete
with, the agency-cost explanation."0 The agency-cost literature argues
that complex capital structures are utilized to control agency costs, but
that these structures also create conflicts among co-investors, exemplified
by the well known stockholder-bondholder conflict." This paper does
not deny that assertion, but it does claim that complex capital structures
may also be used to control other investor conflicts. Viewed in this way
conflicts among claim-holders are a cause as well as an effect of complex
capital structures.
Previous writers have not extensively explored conflicts among co-in-
vestors, other than the stockholder-bondholder conflict. Indeed, some
may doubt whether these conflicts affect the total value of the firm. Fol-
lowing the example of Smith and Warner, I construct two competing
hypotheses, which I call the "Irrelevance Hypothesis" and the "Costly
Contracting Hypothesis."' 2
The Irrelevance Hypothesis holds that conflicts among co-investors do
9. I have previously discussed the problems created by dispersed ownership in the face of a bid
for a controlling but partial interest in the firm, to be followed by a "take-out" merger at a lower
price, in Carney, Shareholder Coordination Costs, Shark Repellents, and Takeout Mergers: The Case
Against Fiduciary Duties, 1983 AM. B. FOUND. REs. J. 341 [hereinafter Shark Repellents] and in
Carney, Two-Tier Tender Offers and Shark Repellents, 4 No.2 MIDLAND CORP. FIN. J. 48 (Summer,
1986) [hereinafter Two-Tier Tender Offers]. Discussions of the relationship of ownership dispersion
to agency costs appear in Demsetz, The Structure of Ownership and the Theory of the Firm, 26 J.
LAW & ECON. 375 (1983) and in Demsetz & Lehn, The Structure of Corporate Ownership: Causes
and Consequences, 93 J. POL.EON. 1155 (1985).
10. The seminal work on agency costs is that of Jensen & Meckling, supra note 8. These au-
thors attempt to explain the "ownership structure" of the firm--"namely the relative amounts of
ownership claims held by insiders (management) and outsiders (investors with no direct role in the
management of the firm)." Id. at n.l. This Article attempts to add to our understanding of the
reasons for the complexity of the capital structures of individual firms, and of the contractual ar-
rangements used to secure promises to various investors.
11. Jensen & Meckling, supra note 8 at 334-37.
12. Smith & Warner, On Financial Contracting: An Analysis of Bond Covenants, 7 J. FIN.
EcoN. 117, 119-122 (1979).
[Vol. 65:1
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not affect the value of the firm, because investors can eliminate them at
zero marginal cost. This occurs because rational investors will choose to
diversify their portfolios against other firm-specific risks, and will, in the
process, protect themselves from being on the losing side in conflicts
among investors.
The Costly Contracting Hypothesis holds that investor conflicts can-
not be eliminated at zero marginal cost through diversification, but can
be achieved through some combination of diversification and costly fi-
nancial contracts. These contracts may take the form of capital struc-
tures or other agreements between investors and the firm, including
decision rules, "shark repellents" and restraints on share transfers.
B. The Nature of Coordination Costs
I use the term "coordination costs" to describe the costs of: (1) diver-
gent preferences for firm distributions and investments, whether of cur-
rent income or of capital;' 3 (2) divergent preferences for risky projects; 14
(3) opportunistic behavior by one co-owner or group of co-owners; and
(4) investor actions to minimize these conflicts, including contracting and
enforcement costs.1 5
Investor differences are well known, and need not be elaborated here.
They explain the diversity of financial instruments found in markets, but
they do not explain why any single firm would choose a complex capital
structure or other costly contracts. A brief review of differences in inves-
tor preferences is followed by an explanation of how preferences of inves-
tors within a single firm may change.
Investor preferences for savings versus consumption (and conse-
quently, for firm reinvestment versus distribution) vary according to the
13. See text infra at notes 74-101.
14. See text infra at notes 171-174.
15. See text infra at notes 102-170 and 175-180. These costs, in another setting, have been
denominated "imposition costs." J. BUCHANAN & G. TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT, 64-
68 (1962). I do not use that term here because of its nonconsensual implications. Where the basis of
the relationship is contractual, as in an investment, the costs can be said to be voluntarily assumed,
at least in efficient markets where investors hold rational expectations. In addition to the costs
described, these conflicts entail other costs similar to those associated with agency costs: transaction
costs of bargaining to reduce the impact of these conflicts; bonding costs to assure compliance with
the terms of the bargain; and monitoring costs to detect non-compliance and enforce the bargain.
Indeed, they are sometimes identified as agency costs. JENSEN & SMITH, STOCKHOLDER, MAN-
AGER, AND CREDITOR INTERESTS: APPLICATIONS OF AGENCY THEORY in Recent Advances in
Corporate Finance, 93 (E. Altman & M. Subrahmanyam eds. 1985).
1987]
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individual's progress through the life cycle, according to Modigliani. 16
Individual risk preferences also vary for a variety of reasons, 17 idiosyn-
cratic as well as systematic. Thus individuals with greater wealth or in-
come should have a relatively stronger preference for risk (or weaker
aversion) because the rate of decline in their personal marginal utility of
money is lower than for less well-off individuals."8 Similarly, younger
investors, with a greater portion of their income stream ahead of them,
should be less risk averse than older investors. Finally, investors whose
portfolios are less diversified should be more risk averse than others.
Self-selection, in terms of investing in firms with investors who possess
similar sets of preferences, or in financial instruments containing contrac-
tual provisions that assure that certain preferences will be honored, can
resolve initial conflicts. Investing in firms where all investors are at
roughly the same stage in their life cycle and where changes in investor
preferences are likely to all bear the same sign, if not precise magnitude,
thus avoids conflicts over reinvestments.' 9 Although closely held firms
can employ this process with relative ease, publicly held firms must an-
nounce and adhere to clearly stated policies about dividends and rein-
vestment in order to accomplish it.20
Although this observation partially explains how investor interests are
accommodated, it explains relatively little about the complexity of the
capital structures of individual firms and the contract terms that are ob-
16. Modigliani has stated that saving is a function of the relationship between the level of cur-
rent income and average lifetime income. According to Modigliani one saves in periods when cur-
rent income is above one's lifetime average, and dissaves when it falls below (as in retirement). See
generally, Modigliani & Brumberg, Utility Analysis and the Consumption Function: An Interpreta-
tion of Cross-Section Data, in POST KEYNESIAN ECONOMICS, 388 (K. Kurihara ed. 1954), reprinted
in 2 THE COLLECTED PAPERS OF FRANCO MODIGLIANI, 79 (A. Abel, ed. 1980) [hereinafter MODI-
GLIANI PAPERS], and Modigliani, The Life Cycle Hypothesis of Savings Twenty Years Later, in CON-
TEMPORARY ISSUES IN ECONOMICS; PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONFERENCE OF THE ASSOCIATION OF
UNIVERSITY TEACHERS OF ECONOMICS 2 (M. Parkin & A. Nobay eds. 1975), reprinted in 2 MODI-
GLIANI PAPERS, supra, at 41.
17. See, eg., G. STIGLER, THE THEORY OF PRICE 275-81 (3d 1966); see also infra text accom-
panying notes 171.
18. As wealth increases, the rate of change in the slope of the marginal utility curve for wealth
declines, so that differences between the utility loss from losing a risky bet and the utility gains from
winning decline. See generally J. WESTON & E. BRIGHAM, MANAGERIAL FINANCE 359-63 (6th ed.
1978).
19. Ohlson has observed that ex post unanimity permits only limited diversity in individuals'
characteristics. Ohlson, Ex Post Stockholder Unanimity, 9 J. BANKING & FIN. 387 (1985). This
article focuses on the response of investors and firms when that condition does not obtain.
20. See generally De Alessi & Fishe, Why Do Corporations Distribute Assets? An Analysis of
Dividends and Capital Structure, 143 J. INSTITUTIONAL AND THEORETICAL ECON. 34 (1987).
[Vol. 65:1
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served. If the initial accommodation of investor interests were the only
concern, one would expect firms to set discrete policies and offer distinc-
tive types of securities, not to employ complex capital structures.2' Com-
plex capital structures and other costly contracts arise because the
preferences of the investor group can change over time.
The initial unity of investor preferences concerning firm investment
and distribution policies may diverge for a variety of reasons. First, it
may have been illusory, the result of bounded investor rationality. Real
differences may have been suppressed by the parties in order to avoid
"queering the deal."22 Second, some investors may enter various phases
of the life cycle before others.23 Some may reach retirement age, with its
expected preference for consumption and an increase in risk aversion,
while younger co-investors retain stronger preferences for reinvestment
and risk. Increases (or decreases) in the wealth of individual investors in
the firm can also alter their preferences for risk.
Conflicts may also occur because of the transfer of investment units, or
exogenous events, such as a change in the firm's capital structure that
generally increases the preferences of equity holders for risk, albeit at
differential rates.24 Major one-time changes in firm wealth may also lead
to changes in investor preferences for risk and consumption versus in-
vestment. Changes in firm wealth, for example, may have a major im-
21. Merton Miller has observed this in the context of the tax effects of debt:
There will be an equilibrium level of aggregate corporate debt.., and hence an equilib-
rium debt-equity ratio for the corporate sector as a whole. But there would be no optimum
debt ratiofor any individualfirm. Companies following a no-leverage or low leverage strat-
egy (like IBM or Kodak) would find a market among investors in the high tax brackets;
those opting for a high leverage strategy (like the electric utilities) would find the natural
clientele for their securities at the other end of the scale. But one clientele is as good as the
other. And in this important sense, it would still be true that the value of any firm, in
equilibrium, would be independent of its capital structure, despite the deductibility of inter-
est payments in computing corporate income taxes.
Miller, Debt and Taxes, 32 J. FIN. 261, 269 (1977). See also Stiglitz, Taxation, Corporate Financial
Policy and the Cost of Capital, 2 J. PUBLIC ECON. 1 (1973).
22. A phrase borrowed from W. KLEIN & J. COFFEE JR., BUSINESS ORGANIZATION AND FI-
NANCE: LEGAL AND ECONOMIC PRINCIPLES, 63-65 (1986).
23. MODIGLIANI PAPERS, supra note 16.
24. Shareholders will generally prefer riskier projects as debt becomes a larger proportion of
capital structure, whether through new borrowings or a reduction in the value of the equity invested
in the firm. Black & Cox, Valuing Corporate Securities: Some Effects of Bond Indenture Provisions,
31 J. FIN. 351, 357 (1976); Modigliani & Miller, The Cost of Capital, Corporation Finance and the
Theory of Investment, 48 AM. EcON. REv. 261, 263 (1958); Smith & Warner, On Financial Con-
tracting; An Analysis ofBond Covenants, 7 J. FIN. ECON. 117, 118-19 (1979). Unless investors share
identically sloped marginal utility curves for wealth, however, their preferences will increase at vari-
able rates, thus creating conflicts.
19871
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pact on investor wealth, particularly in closely held firms or firms with a
single dominant investor.25
In publicly held firms changes in the preferences of individual inves-
tors will generally lead investors experiencing the change to adjust their
portfolios. If the affected investor also controls firm policies, a situation
more commonly found in closely held firms, firm policies may change to
maximize the welfare of the dominant investor. In such cases minority
investors will be forced to make costly portfolio adjustments or, if such
adjustments are not possible, live with the reduced utility resulting from
the policy change.26
Following Klein, Crawford and Alchian, investments are described
here as firm specific, and as sources of appropriable quasi-rents that re-
flect the duration of the investment and the extent to which the invest-
25. A one-time increase (or decrease) in firm wealth will have a disproportionate effect on the
wealth of dominant and undiversified shareholders, that may not be shared by minority and perhaps
more fully diversified investors. This creates an increased (or decreased) demand for firm invest-
ment. To the extent a one-time increase leaves the dominant investor even less diversified than
before, his risk aversion may increase relative to that of his co-investors. A one-time decrease in the
value of that investment increases diversification, and thus decreases that investor's relative aversion
to risky projects.
26. The exit option may not be available to minority investors in closely held firms, if active
participation (as an agent) and consent of other agents is necessary for an investor to hold or transfer
claims against the firm. Thus, although the minority holder's investment might be more valuable to
another investor, the transfer may not be possible. Unanimous consent requirements for the admis-
sion of new partners are examples of such exit restrictions; consent restraints on transfer of corpo-
rate shares are another. See, e.g., UNIF. PARTNERSHIP AcT, § 18(g) (requiring unanimous consent
for admission of new partners). Larger partnerships may relax the rule. See, e.g., Day v. Sidley &
Austin, 394 F. Supp. 986 (D.D.C. 1975) (majority vote for admission of new partners). Within
limits, partners may have dissolution rights not generally available to shareholders. UNIF.
PARTNERHSIP AcT, § 31(l)(b) (any partner may dissolve when no definite term or particular under-
taking is specified). Consent restraints on the transfer of shares in the closely held firm are discussed
in II F. O'NEAL, CLOSE CORPORATIONS ch. 7 (2d ed. 1971).
Although co-owners can make side payments to obtain consent to such transfers, such events seem
rare. This may be partially explained by judicially created prohibitions against the sale of the vote.
See, e g., Brady v. Bean, 221 Ill. App. 279 (1921). In Brady, one stockholder's objection to the sale
of the business was overcome by a payment from the other stockholder, who was also a bondholder.
The court held that the payment rendered the agreement to vote for the sale void.
Where consent to a transfer of shares is withheld, some courts may invalidate such restrictions as
an unreasonable restraint on alienation, while others may imply an obligation not to withhold con-
sent unreasonably. Compare Rafe v. Hindin, 29 App. Div. 481, 288 N.Y.S.2d 662 (1968) (restraint
held invalid); with Carlson v. Ringgold County Mutual Tel. Co., 252 Iowa 748,108 N.W.2d 478
(1961); andIn re West Waterway Lumber Co., 59 Wash. 2d 310, 367 P.2d 807 (1962) (both holding
that consent restraints contain an implied covenant that consent will not be unreasonably withheld).
The general rule, however, is that such consent restraints are enforceable.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol65/iss1/2
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ment contract is fully contingent.27 Some co-investor conflicts involve
post-contractual opportunistic behavior by one large investor or an inves-
tor coalition, such as the holders of one class of securities. 28 These con-
flicts may involve attempts to transfer wealth from minority to majority
interests, or stockholder attempts to gain at the expense of bondholders.
Attempted wealth transfers between or among stockholders frequently
involve some form of self-dealing, or a bargain between majority and mi-
nority interests in which the minority feels overreached.29 Stockholder
attempts to gain at bondholder expense generally involve increasing dis-
tributions to stockholders, increasing the firm's debt to equity ratio, or
selecting riskier projects for the firm, all of which inflict higher risks on
bondholders."0
C. The Structure of the Paper
Part II of the paper tests the Irrelevance Hypothesis. It consists
largely of formal demonstrations that diversification can completely
eliminate the cost of investor conflicts only if unrealistic assumptions are
made. Diversification to protect against self-dealing transactions by
dominant shareholders requires accurate predictions of the identity of
raiders and targets, and disproportionate investments in them based on
those predictions. In some publicly held firms and in all closely held
firms diversification imposes increased agency costs, which considerably
limits the extent of diversification.
This part of the paper observes that relatively small savings in coordi-
nation costs can explain elaborate capital structures and contractual re-
27. Klein, Crawford & Alchain, Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents and the Competitive
Contracting Process, 21 J. LAW & ECON. 297 (1978). These authors assume, however, that opportu-
nism can occur only where productive assets are leased, and not where they are owned by the user.
Id. at 302. This article demonstrates that the creation of separate claims on the firm's future income
stream creates new occasions for opportunism. The relationship between duration and risk is dis-
cussed infra text at notes 208-212.
28. See 0. WILLIAMSON, MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES: ANALYSIS AND ANTITRUST IMPLI-
CATIONS, 26-30 (1975). Williamson describes such behavior as involving "self-interest seeking with
guile" and "making 'false or empty, that is, self-disbelieved, threats and promises' in the expectation
that individual advantage will thereby be realized." Id. at 26 (citing I. GOFFMAN, STRATEGIC IN-
TERACTION, 105 (1969).
Klein, Crawford & Alchian, supra note 27, expand the notion of opportunistic behavior to include
post-contractual behavior where original promises are not necessarily disingenuous, but where the
contractual period is long enough to allow potential gains from such behavior to arise by virtue of
investments in specific assets.
29. See infra text accompanying notes 102-124, 134-152.
30. See infra notes 173-179.
1987]
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sponses, where scale economies are substantial. This part also provides a
positive explanation for the presence of control premiums and minority
discounts, distinct from the agency cost explanation."1
Part III attempts to test the Costly Contracting Hypothesis by explor-
ing in detail the nature of investor conflicts and contractual responses to
them. I demonstrate that coordination costs provide an important expla-
nation for the capital structure of firms, as well as for other contractual
arrangements among co-investors, which the agency-cost hypothesis does
not entirely explain.32 I argue that even where the unification of owner-
ship and control minimizes agency costs, elaborate and costly contracts
are used to control investor conflicts. The similarity of devices used in
publicly held firms suggests that coordination costs, as well as agency
costs, play an important role in explaining the structure of these firms.
Again, following Smith and Warner, I offer qualitative rather than quan-
titative evidence for this proposition.3"
Part IV explores the reasons why firms exist in the face of positive
costs for joint investments. Investors gain the advantages of scale econo-
mies, diversification and outside monitoring, among others, in exchange
for bearing the costs of conflict and opportunism. Klein, Crawford and
Alchian explain the creation of some firms as a means of reducing the
costs of opportunism, but this article observes that investments in firms
often create other appropriable quasi-rents. These quasi-rents are pre-
sumably lower than those created by other forms of contracting. Where
investment markets are not fully efficient, as in the case of closely held
firms, bounded rationality may well play a role in explaining the creation
of firms.
Part V discusses some implications of these costs for the ownership
structure of firms. Certain kinds of contracts used in closely held firms
are seen as substitutes for structural solutions employed in publicly held
firms. The theory explains the relatively larger sums spent by co-owners
in firms, such as partnerships and closely held corporations, where diver-
sification does not satisfactorily resolve these conflicts; the relationship
31. See infra text accompanying notes 65-70.
32. The proof of these arguments is not offered in this Article; but an intuitive grasp of part of
the proof can be obtained from the realization that participants in closely held enterprises, where
agency costs presumably are lower than in larger firms, expend considerable resources on con-
tracting with respect to ownership rights.
33. Smith & Warner, supra note 12, at 122; note that"... qualitative evidence... is frequently
employed in the social sciences and in particular [sic] the property rights/economic analysis of law
literature. [citations omitted]"
[Vol. 65:1
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between the duration of the claim and the extent of contracting; and why
other devices, such as settling up and judicial intervention, play a larger
role in open residual claims.
II. CAN DIVERSIFICATION ELIMINATE THE COSTS OF JOINT
OWNERSHIP?
In this selection I reject the Irrelevance Hypothesis, which holds that
investor conflicts are solved at zero marginal cost because activities such
as diversification are undertaken for other reasons. Despite the fact that
many such conflicts are resolved in this manner, in many cases this solu-
tion is neither complete nor costless.
The strong form of the argument in favor of the Irrelevance Hypothe-
sis has been made by Easterbrook and Fischel. These authors have ad-
dressed the issue of unequal sharing of the gains from takeovers, where
some shareholders receive a control premium, while others are "squeezed
out" in a takeout merger after control is acquired. Easterbrook and Fis-
chel argue that the possibility of diversification, not its exercise, justifies
unequal sharing of gains from takeovers because diversification is avail-
able at "a remarkably low cost."34 They argue that "an investor with a
reasonably diversified portfolio would be on the winning side of some
transactions and the losing side of others."35 I assert that diversification
is a less than complete solution for two reasons. First, agency and trans-
action costs of diversification may counsel against holding a fully diversi-
fied portfolio under some circumstances. Second, diversification will not
provide a complete solution to problems of opportunistic behavior except
under the most restrictive (and unrealistic) set of assumptions.
Even where diversification is a major part of the solution, capital struc-
ture and contract still perform a role. Where scale economies exist, a
relatively small expenditure on contractual solutions can lead to elabo-
rate capital structures and contracts. Assuming efficient capital markets
and rational expectations, firms will bear the costs of investor conflicts
not diversified away, and will seek contractual provisions designed to
minimize their costs. 36
34. Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 2, at 713 (1982).
35. Id. at 712. Though I reject the reasoning of Easterbrook and Fischel's arguments, I do not
reject the conclusion, because investors are compensated ex ante for purchasing minority interests.
See infra text accompanying notes 65-75.
36. This is so because investors (at least some, at the margin) have the option of sole ownership
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A. The Limited Role of Diversification
Modem portfolio theory counsels diversification to minimize the effect
of variances in firm outcomes (non-systematic risk).37 Because rational
investors will generally diversify for this reason, we must ask whether
such diversification also eliminates coordination costs at zero marginal
cost. Investors can generally expect to be on the winning side as fre-
quently as the losing side of honest differences of opinion about firm in-
vestment and distribution policies.38 They therefore have little incentive
to expend resources on such disputes. This argument has considerable
power, and solves many of the problems described here. But diversifica-
tion is not costless, and agency and other costs may lead to less than
complete diversification under a variety of conditions. Furthermore,
even costless diversification would not completely eliminate the expected
costs of investor conflicts.
L The Agency Costs of Diversification
In some cases diversification is obtained only at the price of increased
agency costs.39 In firms where there is considerable latitude for manage-
ment discretion, shareholder monitoring may help to control agency
costs. Such firms generally exhibit some concentration of share owner-
ship, which ameliorates the free rider problem of shareholder monitor-
ing. These investors may rationally hold less than fully diversified
portfolios, if gains from such monitoring exceed the gains from complete
diversification.
The dominant stockholder, in a publicly held firm, who is able to de-
termine the outcome of firm decisions, is not subject to the risks of losing
arguments about firm policy. Nevertheless, other costs may prevent sub-
stantial minority interests in publicly held firms from fully diversifying.
Large block owners may exist, if the firm has acquired privately held
firms in exchange for restricted securities, the sale of which would result
in substantial taxable capital gains.4 In other cases defeated bidders for
of enterprises and other investments. Cf, Easterbrook, Managers'Discretion and Investors' Welfare:
Theories and Evidence, 9 DEL. J. CORP. L. 540 (1984).
37. W. SHARPE, PORTFOLIO THEORY AND CAPITAL MARKETS (1970); J. LORIE & M. HAMIL-
TON, THE STOCK MARKET: THEORIES AND EVIDENCE 171-227 (1973); R. BREALEY & S. MYERS,
PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE, 112-130 (1981); J. COHEN, E. ZINBARG & A. ZEIKEL, IN-
VESTMENT ANALYSIS AND PORTFOLIO MANAGEMENT, 660-96 (2d ed. 1978).
38. This is the argument in Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 2, at 711-14.
39. Demsetz & Lehn, supra note 9.
40. The Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77a et seq. (1982), may impose its own costs on
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control retain substantial minority interests due to tax disincentives for
resale or regulations prohibiting unregistered or short-swing sales.41 For
all of these minority interests, diversification is neither a complete nor
costless solution to the risks associated with disputes about firm policies.
2. Closely Held Firms and Agency Costs
In some firms high agency costs may make separation of ownership
and control more costly than assuming the risk of having large holdings
of residual claims in the hands of decision agents. Service firms, in which
agents exercise considerable discretion about the quality and volume of
output and labor input often exhibit this phenomenon.4" The Demsetz
and Lehn thesis can be extended to closely held firms. Here minority
holdings as well as majority interests may be relatively large, both as a
percentage of firm ownership and of personal wealth. In such cases,
agents will forego some diversification to combine ownership and control
(or residual claims and decisionmaking) in a small number of agents. We
observe this form in firms that lack significant economies of scale and do
not require complex decision hierarchies to make use of specialized deci-
sion skills throughout the organization.43
3. Bonding
Service industries may depend primarily upon the skills of firm agents,
which are frequently developed at firm expense. Bonding continued de-
livery of an agent's services to the firm assures that individuals who de-
velop such human capital devote it to the enterprise for a period
sufficient to allow the employer to recover a return on its investment.
Long-term employment contracts provide weak protection because it is
often difficult to recover damages for breach." Investing capital in un-
diversification, either during the holding periods required for restricted securities, or where the hold-
ers are "control" persons, indefinitely. These costs take the form of registration costs in most in-
stances, or some discount from market value for resales that do not constitute a distribution.
41. Evidence of the presence of defeated bidders in firms appears from the development of so-
called "standstill" agreements with holders of large blocks of shares in publicly held firms. See, e.g.,
Enterra Corp. v. SGS Associates, 600 F. Supp. 678 (E.D. Pa. 1985); Bialkin, The Use of Standstill
Agreements in Corporate Transactions, in 13TH ANN. INST. SEc. REG. 33 (1982) and FLEISCHER, 1
TENDER OFFERS: DEFENSES, RESPONSES AND PLANNING 395413 (1983).
42. Demsetz & Lehn, supra note 9.
43. Fama & Jensen, Agency Problems and Residual Claims, 26 J. LAW & EcON., 327, 333
(1983); McChesney, Team Production, Monitoring, and Profit Sharing in Law Firms: An Alternative
Hypothesis, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 379, 383 (1982).
44. On the difficulties of proving actual damages and on judicial treatment of liquidated dam-
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marketable securities, whether through restricted stock options or securi-
ties that cannot be resold for a period of time, or in shares that are
subject to contractual restraints on alienation, is one form of bonding
that may persuade co-venturers to take the risk of investments in human
capital.45 Such bonding will only be effective if the investment is non-
trivial for employees. Managers in publicly held firms frequently receive
a substantial share of their compensation in stock options and other
stock-related forms. Such managers, who hold a substantial part of their
capital, both financial and human, in the form of claims against the firm,
are unlikely to be fully diversified."
4. Firm Specific Human Capital
Employers may ask highly skilled managers or professionals to forego
development of their general (and marketable) human capital in order to
serve the firm, and develop human capital specific to the employer's
needs.47 Although the investment portfolios of such managers may be
ages provisions in employment contracts, see 5 A. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 1071 (1951).
I do not mean to exclude the use of covenants not to compete as an important device in encouraging
the development of human capital by employers. See generally Rubin, Human Capital and Cove-
nants Not to Compete, 10 J. LEGAL STUD. 93 (1981). Covenants not to compete also present enforce-
ment problems, because courts are generally hostile toward them, seeing them, incorrectly, as
contracts in restraint of trade that should be narrowly construed. 6A CORBIN, supra, § 1394 and
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 188 (1981).
45. Thus an investment in unmarketable securities creates firm-specific capital and prevents
agents from appropriating by early departure general human capital, created by employment with
the firm.
46. Demsetz, supra note 9, at 388, notes the substantial size of directors' holdings in their firms.
W. Lewellen, Management and Ownership in Large Firms, 24 J. FIN. 299 (1969) finds that stock-
based compensation for top executives was almost five times as great as wages. See also, Smith &
Watts, Incentive Plans and Tax Effects of Executive Compensation Plans, 7 AUSTRALIAN J. MoT.
139, 148 (1982). These authors point out that sales to managers of restricted shares exacerbate the
problem. Id. Although resale restrictions may be part of the plan, id. at 142, the securities laws may
also impose such restrictions, for example, restrictions on resale of unregistered securities and those
held by "affiliates" (Securities Act of 1933, Rule 144, 17 C.F.R. Sec. 230.144 (1984)) and on sales by
insiders (Securities Exchange Act of 1934, §§ 10(b) and 16(b), 15 U.S.C. §§ 78(j)(b), 78(p)(b)
(1982)).
47. The "managing partner" of a law firm may face such a problem, with respect to practicing
law (maintaining professional skills) or dealing with valued clients (maintaining client-specfic rela-
tionships). Such a partner is often asked to forego these activities, and concentrate on internal firm
management, which reduces mobility, and consequently, his or her bargaining power vis-a-vis co-
partners. In other cases a manager may be bound to the firm by a long-term employment contract.
See, e.g., In re Security Finance Co., 49 Cal. 2d 370, 317 P.2d 1 (1957) (agreement to work full time
could only be altered by unanimous shareholder consent; corporate refusal to increase either salary
or dividends justified dissolution). See generally Kraakman, Corporate Liability Strategies and the
Cost of Legal Controls, 93 YALE L.J. 857 (1984).
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otherwise adequately diversified, this single major investment of their
skills may result in suboptimal diversification. Thus they may have con-
cerns over the sale or liquidation of the enterprise not shared by co-inves-
tors. Employers can address these concerns by adjusting agency
compensation contracts (such as guaranteed severance payments) or by
making other arrangements more directly related to investment con-
tracts, such as decision rules for mergers and other business combina-
tions.48 These choices evidence the relationship between firm-specific
human capital and other types of capital investments in the firm.
5. The Stockholder-Bondholder Conflict
Wealth-transfer conflicts also arise between classes of investors in the
firm. The stockholder-bondholder conflict is well documented in the fi-
nance literature.49 By increasing firm borrowings or distributions to
shareholders, or by selecting projects riskier than the firm's pre-borrow-
ing set, stockholders can increase their wealth at the expense of
bondholders.5"
In order to protect themselves bondholders can diversify their holdings
48. So-called "golden parachute" contracts provide specified severance payments to managers
if, after a change in control, they terminate their employment with the firm. Cf I FLEISCHER, supra
note 41, at 88-95; WINTER, STUMPF & HAWKINS, SHARK REPELLENTS & GOLDEN PARACHUTES,
PART Two (1983); Grisham & Rake, Future Executive Bail Outs: Will Golden Parachutes Fill the
American Business Skies?, 14 TEXAS TECH. L. REv. 615 (1983); Haggerty, Golden Parachute Agree-
ments: Cushioning Executive Bailouts in the Wake of A Tender Offer, 57 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 516
(1983); Profusek, Executive Employment Contracts in the Takeover Context, 6 CORP. L. REv. 99
(1983); Riger, On Golden Parachutes-Ripcords or Ripoffs? Some Comments on Special Termination
Agreements, 3 PACE L. REv. 15 (1982); Spalding, Golden Parachutes: Executive Employment Con-
tracts, 40 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1117 (1983); Comment, Golden Parachutes and the Business Judg-
ment Rule: Toward a Proper Standard of Judicial Review, 94 YALE L.J. 909 (1985); Carney, Pols
Poking Holes in Golden Parachutes, Wall St. J. Apr. 16, 1984.
If a manager is asked to invest in such firm specific human capital, shareholders may post a bond
against their own opportunistic behavior (such as firing the manager) either by granting him a term
employment contract, severance pay guarantees (even in the absence of a change in control) or by
providing a pension plan with the manager's interest phased in over time to keep pace with the value
of the investment in specific human capital. De Alessi & Fishe, supra note 20. "Defined Benefit"
pension plans, where payments are generally based on the employee's years of service, represent such
a solution. If coupled with lengthy vesting periods (now limited by ERISA), pension plans may
provide a bond for the manager's good behavior. Restrictive decision rules for business combina-
tions are discussed in text infra at notes 153-69.
49. Jensen & Smith, supra note 15, at 111-124; see also McDaniel, Bondholders and Corporate
Governance, 41 Bus. LAW 413 (1986).
50. Jensen & Meckling, supra note 8, at 334-35; KLEIN & COFFEE, supra, note 22, at 209;
Smith & Warner, supra note 12.
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to include equity as well as debt.51 If all investors hold equal proportions
of debt and equity, all incentives for wealth redistributions between
classes are eliminated. 2 Because some investors have strong preferences
for fixed income and security, however, diversification through equity in-
vestments imposes costs. In addition, the transaction costs of converting
equity claims into a steady income stream may not be trivial.5 3 Further-
more, equity investments are subject to market risk, which may impose
significant costs upon a risk-averse investor.5 4 Diversification by bond-
holders also involves the same deficiency as it does for stockholders; the
investor must hold equal portions of equity (the transferee) and debt (the
transferor).55 Although bondholders can better manage this difficulty
because these claims can be held in the same firm, costly portfolio adjust-
ments will nevertheless be required when a firm issues additional classes
of securities.5 6
B. The Limited Power of Diversification
1. Portfolios that Deviate from the Mean
Even a fully diversified portfolio will not eliminate all coordination
costs. An investor who selects a portfolio that deviates significantly from
the mean in either payout policy or risk will be unable to maintain the
desired performance by employing a "buy and hold" strategy. Changes
in firm strategies and policies, which are random, tend toward a normal
51. Jensen & Meckling, supra note 8, at 352-53, suggest that bondholders may obtain some
protection by virtue of the fact that managers frequently hold fixed (salary) claims that align their
interests with those of bondholders, although stockholders may realign their interests with claims on
the upper tail of firm outcomes through the use of options and warrants.
52. Galai & Masulis, The Option Pricing Model and the Risk Factor of Stock, 3 J. FIN. EcoN. 53
(1976). Such diversification appears in some leveraged buyouts in the form of "strip financing," in
which investors purchase approximately equal proportions of all classes of the issuer's securities, and
the securities are "stapled" together (so that transfer of separate classes is not permitted) to prevent
later separation and development of conflicts. Jensen, The Takeover Controversy: Analysis and Evi-
dence 4, 2 MIDLAND CORP. FIN. J. 6, 15 (Summer, 1986).
53. The literature dealing with dividend policy generally ignores these costs, on the assumption
that transaction costs are low in efficient capital markets. But see De Alessi & Fishe, supra note 20.
54. See note 58, infra. One measure of the cost may be the cost of purchasing market index
futures to hedge against market risk. Another is the difference between the risk-free treasury bond
interest rate and the expected return on a stock portfolio.
55. See Cox, Compensation, Deterrence and the Market, 52 GEO. WASH. L. Rsv. 745, 749-51
(1984) for the formulation of this solution in the context of squeeze-outs of equity investors; the same
formula applies to the solution of the stockholder-bondholder conflict.
56. But even this may not be possible, if stock is closely held and bonds are publicly traded, as
in the case of finance subsidiaries of publicly held firms.
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distribution, which in turn pushes the portfolio toward the mean.57 A
high-bracket taxpayer, for example, may prefer a policy of zero dividends
and total reinvestment, to achieve long-term capital gains. Over time,
however, any changes in firm dividend policies must tend toward greater
(than zero) dividend payments. An investor selecting a portfolio of firms
that pay out their entire cash flow will necessarily experience a similar
and opposite change, toward some reinvestment. Investors selecting a
level of market risk that varies from a beta of one will also find that over
time their portfolios will tend toward one. 8
2. Diversification and Dominance
Other disputes involve attempted wealth transfers from one group of
investors to another within the firm, generally from minority sharehold-
ers to dominant shareholders. These transfers typically take the form of
sales of the firm's shares or assets to the majority interests or takeout
mergers, all at bargain prices to the majority. 9
Because dominant stockholders in publicly held firms are frequently
other publicly held firms, investors have an opportunity to be on the win-
ning side in such instances.' If all dominant stockholders were publicly
held firms, the probability that investors would win as often as they
would lose would be one. To the extent that dominant investors are not
publicly held firms, diversification provides something less than symmet-
rical participation in the gains and losses from wealth transfers. 61 Thus
57. See generally W. HAYS, STATISTICS FOR THE SOCIAL SCIENCES, 227-231 (2d ed. 1983).
58. Beta measures the sensitivity of an investment's return to market movements. The average
beta of all stocks is one. R. BREALEY & S. MYERS, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE, 127
(1981). See generally Carney, Causation in Insider Trading, 36 CATH. U. L. REV. 863, 864 (1987).
59. The development of such behavior is traced in Carney, Fundamental Corporate Changes,
Minority Shareholders and Business Purposes, 1980 AM. BAR FOUND. RES. J. 69 [hereinafter Busi-
ness Purposes]. See also F. O'NEAL & R. THOMPSON, O'NEAL'S OPPRESSION OF MINORITY SHARE-
HOLDERS (1985) [hereinafter OPPRESSION]. In closely held firms, wealth transfers may also occur
when dominant investors, who also perform agency functions, receive excessive salary and bonus
payments. Such payments are treated here as coordination costs, rather than agency costs, because
they arise by virtue of ownership control, rather than agency position.
60. Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 2 at 713, argue that "the existence of diversification-not
its employment-supports our argument for allowing the gains from corporate control transactions
to be apportioned unequally." This article does not dispute that gains from corporate control trans-
actions ought to be allowed to be apportioned unequally. It simply demonstrates that diversification,
though necessary to such an argument, is not sufficient. The article also demonstrates why rational
investors may choose costly contracting as a partial solution to costs not fully dealt with through
diversification.
61. The probability of equal participation on both sides of minority to majority wealth trans-
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diversification is at best an imperfect solution to the wealth-transfer
problem.
Even if all dominant investors were publicly held firms, diversification
might not provide complete protection for another reason. Not only
must the number of wins and losses be equal, but their magnitude must
also be equal. James Cox has demonstrated that for diversification to
provide such complete protection, the investor's interest in the parent
company must represent the same percentage as the investment in the
minority interest in the subsidiary.62 Put another way, the relevant inter-
ests for purposes of analaysis are the transferor (the minority interest in
the subsidiary) and the transferee (the dominant firm). Under these con-
ditions, if we assume that a bidder owns a bare majority (fifty percent
plus one share) in the subsidiary, an investor must own a percentage
twice as large in the dominant firm as in the subsidiary in order to avoid
a net wealth transfer.63 Under conditions of uncertainty about the iden-
fers, is a function of the probability that both firms are publicly held and available for investments by
investors generally. This can be expressed as:
%Bp
where: %Tp
Bp = publicly held bidders, and
Tp = publicly held targets.
If all targets are publicly held and only one-half of bidders are publicly
held, the probability of equal participation becomes:
.5 = 
.5
1.0
62. Cox, supra, note 55, at 749-51.
63. Cox, supra note 55, at 750, explains this:
The Amount that the parent gains in an unfair freeze-out can be expressed as:
G = X[(l-p)V]
where
G = dollar amount of freeze-out gain
X = percentage of the minority's value in firm misappropriated to parent in
freeze-out
p = percentage of stock owned by parent
V = value of the firm
To express the freeze-out's effects, g, in terms of a single stockholder, the stockholder's
percentage of ownership of the firm, y, must be reflected as a percentage of his share in the
minority's interest in the firm, -Yp, so that:
g = X[(1-p)Vl-p
yG
It can therefore be seen that , = g.
Although Cox describes these take-outs as "unfair," it might be more positive to describe them as
opportunistic, in terms of taking advantage of contractual silence on questions of limiting the power
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tity of bidders and targets such diversification is highly unlikely.
C. The Role of Liquidity: The Exit Option
Efficient markets characterized by rational investor expectations will
promptly discount any changes in value of securities expected from
changes in firm policies. Where these changes relate merely to general
dividend or reinvestment policies, a one-time change will result in re-
duced utility of the securities to some present holders, accompanied by
an increase in their utility to some prospective holders. Disappointed
investors can sell to those who value the new policies more highly, with
the sellers' only loss being the transaction costs of portfolio shifts. These
costs can be substantial, if repeated adjustments are required over time.
Investors in closely held firms where no market exists or where resale is
contractually restricted, will suffer a once and for all loss of substantial
proportions.
Opportunism can decrease the desirability of the exit option. If stock-
holders engage in a set of actions riskier than bondholders contemplated,
no prospective bondholders will bear more risk for the previously pre-
vailing yield on the bonds. If a dominant investor appears in a firm that
previously lacked one, prospective investors wary of a potential squeeze-
out will discount minority shares accordingly. In both cases current in-
vestors suffer a once-and-for-all loss.
The size of the loss will depend not upon the liquidity of the invest-
ment but upon its duration. Thus losses on an issue of commercial paper
are likely to be small, simply because any increased risk of default will be
imposed for only a brief period before the claims must be paid off. The
length of the investment period increases the expected variance of events
that will influence firm policies toward distributions and risky invest-
ments. As the duration of the investment increases the expected variance
of the exogenous events that can affect the firm's welfare also increases. 64
of majority groups. To characterize them as "unfair" is a normative judgment about outcomes, in
which some investors are disappointed by an outcome made possible through the contractual specifi-
cation of property rights. This paper attempts only to describe the outcomes in a positive manner,
without attempting such normative judgments.
I have already demonstrated that these outcomes can be (and frequently are) contractually pre-
cluded. In many cases, as where shark repellents are adopted by a corporation, contractual limits
are placed on the power of future dominant stockholders. See Carney, Shark Repellents, supra note
9; Carney, Two-Tier Tender Offers supra note 9.
64. In bond markets, this is reflected in higher rates on long-term as opposed to short-term
corporate debt. J. WESToN & E. BRIGHAM, MANAGERIAL FINANCE 827 (6th ed. 1978); R. Brealey
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Losses on long-term debt, and on open-ended claims such as common
stock, include expectations of reduced distributions or greater risk for a
much longer period of time, and thus can consume a much greater pro-
portion of the present value of the claim.
D. The Incidence of the Costs of Joint Ownership: Of Control
Premiums and Minority Discounts
The prospect of wealth transfers in transactions that involve insuffi-
cient gains for winners to compensate losers is a costly one for investors
generally. In efficient capital markets with rational expectations inves-
tors will demand compensation, in the form of increased yields, for ex-
pected coordnation costs that cannot be costlessly diversified away. Thus
the value of the firm would decline if a sole owner attempted to sell a
minority interest in the firm, agency costs aside. This "minority dis-
count" is well known in the legal and appraisal literature on closely held
corporations. 5 It thus becomes a real cost of raising outside funds for
the firm.
Minority discounts and control premiums are not always perfectly
symmetrical. Although symmetry may sometimes exist between minor-
ity losses and majority gains, dead weight losses can alter this relation-
ship, either because gains to dominant investors are not sufficient to
compensate minority owners for their losses, or because participants ex-
pend resources in resisting and furthering such transactions.66 Symmetry
will not hold for other disputes over firm distribution and investment
policies. In these cases the majority shareholder is no better off then
when he was a sole owner of the firm. Minority owners, on the other
hand, are worse off than if they were sole owners.
In efficient capital markets, where investors possess rational expecta-
tions, the minority discount and control premium should equalize inves-
& S. Myers, supra note 37, 470-72 (1981); Klein, The Modern Business Organization: Bargaining
Under Constraints, 91 YALE L.J. 1521, 1561 (1982).
65. Brudney, Efficient Markets and Fair Values in Parent Subsidiary Mergers, 4 J. CORP. L. 63
(1978); Fellows & Painter, Valuing Close Corporations for Federal Wealth Transfer Taxes: A Statu-
tory Solution to the Disappearing Wealth Syndrome, 30 STAN. L. REv. 895 (1978); Maher, An Objec-
tive Measure for a Discount for a Minority Interest and a Premium for a Controlling Interest, 57
TAXES 449 (1979); Comment, Valuing Closely Held Stock- Control Premiums and Minority Dis-
counts, 31 EMORY L.J. 139 (1982) [hereinafter Valuing Closely Held Stock].
66. Even if wealth transfers occur without substantial transaction costs, gains and losses in
utility are rarely symmetrical, given investor risk aversion. Thus wealth transfers impose positive
costs on co-investors.
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tor returns, because a controlling investor can compensate himself for the
premium by selecting firm policies on distributions and risk that maxi-
mize his own, rather than the minority's, welfare. These dominant inves-
tors can also engage in expropriation of wealth from the minority
through various forms of self-dealing with the firm, including takeouts
involving a disparity of treatment.67 Minority investors should receive ex
ante compensation for this cost, in the form of the minority discount.
68
The firm's cost of capital will increase to the extent expected minority
losses exceed expected majority gains.
To the extent that these coordination costs are not costlessly elimi-
nated through diversification, they will also exist for publicly traded
firms, although in a less visible fashion. In firms with widely dispersed
stock ownership all shares represent minority interests. The "minority
discount" or coordination-cost discount represents only the low
probability that someone can develop a dominant ownership position,
and the equally low (and related) probability of a major shift in firm
policies that would require costly portfolio adjustments. Under these
conditions the size of the discount is likely to be small, and because it
applies to all trading shares, invisible.69 The discount becomes visible
67. Rules that require only a majority approval, rather than unanimity, for investor decisions,
including selection of agents, permit the dominant investor to make such choices. This article as-
sumes that there is nothing intrinsically wrong with shareholders voting their own interests. Indeed,
prior to erosion of rules of unanimous consent, the general law clearly held that shareholders could
vote their own interests. Sneed, The Stockholder May Vote as He Pleases: Theory and Fact, 22 U.
PiTr. L. REV. 23 (1960). The erosion of these rules is traced in Carney, Business Purposes, supra
note 59.
68. In efficient capital markets, characterized by investors with rational expectations, the ex-
pected coordination costs will be discounted to present value by minority investors, while the ex-
pected benefits of a majority interest will be treated in a similar manner by those investors acquiring
or selling such a block. (The nature of competition among sellers in efficient markets requires a
qualification of this statement. There is an indication that sellers raise their reservation prices when
they understand that a control block is sought, so that some premium is required. This may be a
function of the fact that each seller recognizes that the bidder faces a potential holdout problem.
Expressing the full richness of this problem exceeds the scope of this article.) Thus arbitrage activi-
ties should bid up the price of control blocks, and bid down the price of minority interests, until the
expected returns are equal. The lack of this market activity explains why returns may not achieve
equality in closely held firms, where investors suffer from bounded rationality. Manne, Our Two
Corporation Systems: Law and Economics, 53 VA. L. REV. 259 (1967) [hereinafter Two Corporation
Systems]. See infra text accompanying notes 191-96 infra for a discussion of bounded rationality.
69. Some valuation cases seem to apply the minority discount even where no control block
existed, or at least where none is apparent in the reported facts. Valuing Closely Held Stock, supra
note 65, at 145. Unsuccessful dissenting shareholders in squeeze-outs have argued that they should
be entitled to a pro rata share of the value of the entire firm, rather than the value of their minority
interest. The Delaware courts have thus far rejected this argument. Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 426
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only if a dominant block appears. This occurrence usually elicits the re-
icprocal of the minority discount, the control premium.7" Although the
A.2d 1333 (Del. Ch. 1981), rev'd on other grounds, 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983). The opinion of the
Chancery Court presages the analysis contained in much of this article:
"While I make no effort to discuss in any detail the workings of either method [of valua-
tion urged by the plaintiff], I think it is significant that both were based on the value that
one would supposedly derive as a result of becoming a 100% owner of an ongoing corpora-
tion as opposed to acquiring a less than 100% interest. The underlying rationale is that
one with full and complete ownership of a company is free to take out of it whatever he
wants, to direct the business as he sees fit, to declare dividends as needed, etc., thus making
his ownership interest a thing of greater value than an ownership interest shared with
others whose rights and financial position must also be honored."
"Thus, plaintiff seems to be suggesting that in evaluating the fairness of the merger terms
to the minority in such a proceeding as this, one must look to what it is reasonably worth
to the former majority shareholder to be rid of all other shareholders so as to become the
sole owner of the enterprise, and then, using that as a basis or starting point, determine
what is a fair amount for it to have paid the minority for the right to become the sole
shareholder."
426 A.2d at 1356, 1359.
The court interpreted the plaintiff's position to mean that he would receive only the value of a
minority interest in an appraisal proceeding and something more in an equitable "fairness" proceed-
ing. The court rejected that approach as not supported by either logic or existing law. Id. at 1359.
70. Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 2. The phenomenon of the control premium, or the
payment of disparate prices to different shareholders in the acquisition of a firm, has generated an
enormous critical literature. Perhaps representative of that literature is Andrews, The Stockholder's
Right to Equal Opportunity in the Sale of Shares, 78 HARV. L. REV. 505 (1965), which argues that
control has value principally because it includes the opportunity to create agency costs for the benefit
of the owner-manager. Andrews takes the same approach as A. BERLE & G. MEANS, THE MODERN
CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY, 244 (1932), that control is a corporate asset and that the
premium for the sale of a control block should go to the corporate treasury. The courts have thus
far rejected this doctrine. See Notes on Equal Opportunity: 4 Theory Thus Far Rejected by the
Courts, in W. CARY & M. EISENBERG, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS, 707 (5th ed.,
unabr., 1980) and R. Hamilton, Private Sale of Control Transactions: Where We Stand Today, 36
CASE W. RES. L. REv. 248 (1985). A few cases seem to have inspired this literature. Perhaps the
most famous is Perlman v. Feldman, 219 F.2d 173 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 952 (1954), where
the dominant shareholder received $20 per share for a 33% block when the market value had not
exceeded $12. See also Brown v. Halbert, 271 Cal. App. 2d 252, 76 Cal. Rptr. 781 (1969) (majority
stockholders rejected offer to sell entire firm, but sold their shares for $1548 per share while minority
were offered S300) and Delano v. Kitch, 542 F.2d 550 (10th Cir. 1976) (dominant stockholder and
corporate attorney negotiated increased salary and sales commission, respectively, as conditions of
agreeing to sell their shares, which put pressure on minority shareholders to sell at price negotiated
by dominant shareholder for his shares alone).
The notion that control is a corporate asset and that any premium paid for it should belong to the
corporation has persisted, despite a lack of judicial acceptance. The notion most recently appeared
in the SEC Advisory Committee on Tender Offers: Report and Recommendations 22-23, reprinted
in 1983 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH), Special Rep. No. 1028. Other landmarks in this voluminous if
generally unenlightening literature include Bayne, The Sale-of-Control Premium: The Definition, 53
MINN. L. REV. 485 (1969); Bayne, The Sale-of-Control Premium: The Disposition, 57 CALIF. L.
REV. 615 (1969); Bayne, The Definition of Corporate Control, 9 ST. Louis U.L.J. 445 (1965); Bayne,
A Legitimate Transfer of Control. the Weyenberg Shoe-Florsheim Case Study, 18 STAN. L. REV.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol65/iss1/2
INVESTOR COORDINATION COSTS
price of all shares in a target firm may rise when a bid is announced, the
disparity between the value of control and minority shares usually in-
creases as the takeover progresses.
The Irrelevance Hypothesis is thus incorrect to the extent that it posits
diversification as a panacea for the costs of investor conflicts; neverthe-
less diversification plays a major albeit not exclusive role in dealing with
such costs. Thus our rejection must be a weak one, because diversifica-
tion plays a major, but not exclusive, role in dealing with the costs of
investor conflicts.
III. THE ROLE OF CONTRACT
Testing the Costly Contracting Hypothesis presents two initial difficul-
ties. First, to the extent that diversification is a relatively complete an-
swer to investor conflicts, expenditures on contracts may be trivial for
some firms. Second, some contracts that seem to solve investor conflicts
also reduce agency costs. In these circumstances we cannot completely
reject the agency-cost hypothesis as the sole explanation of these phe-
nomena. The approach of this section is to unify the discussion of pub-
licly held and closely held firms, in order to resolve these difficulties.
Because investors in closely held firms seem less likely to diversify fully,
contracting should occur more frequently. Because the unity of owner-
ship and control in these firms resolves many agency-cost problems, the
presence of costly contracts in closely held firms is more indicative of
coordination costs. The extent to which similar contracts, or devices
designed to achieve similar outcomes, appear in publicly held firms pro-
vides further support for the Costly Contracting Hypothesis.
438 (1966); Bayne, Corporate Control as a Strict Trustee, 53 GEO. L.J. 543 (1965); Berle, The Price of
Power: Sale of Corporate Control, 50 CORNELL L.Q. 628 (1965); Berle, "Control" in Corporate Law,
58 COLUM. L. REV. 1212 (1958); Boyle, The Sale of Controlling Shares: American Law and the
Jenkins Committee, 13 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 185 (1964); Brudney, Fiduciary Ideology in Transactions
Affecting Corporate Control, 65 MICH. L. REv. 259 (1966); Hazen, Transfers of Corporate Control
and Duties of Controlling Shareholders--Common Law, Tender Offers, Investment Companies-And
a Proposal for Reform, 125 U. PA. L. REV. 1023 (1977); Hill, The Sale of Controlling Shares, 70
HARV. L. REV. 986 (1957); Javaras, Equal Opportunity in the Sale of Controlling Shares: A Reply to
Professor Andrews, 32 U. CHI. L. REV. 420 (1965); Jennings, Trading in Corporate Control, 44 CA-
LIF. L. REV. 1 (1956); Leech, Transactions in Corporate Control, 104 U. PA. L. REV. 725 (1956);
Lipton, Sale of Corporate Control: Going Private, 31 Bus. LAW 1689 (1976); O'Neal, Sale of A
Controlling Corporate Interest: Bases of Possible Seller Liability, 38 U. Prr. L. REV. 9 (1976); Snell,
Reflections on the Practical Aspects of "The Sale of Corporate Control," 1972 DUKE L.J. 1193. With
a few notable exceptions, this literature assumes that receipt of different prices by different investors
for their interests in a firm is either per se wrong, or is at least strong evidence of wrongdoing.
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A. The Extent of Contracting
Three factors influence the expected costs of investor conflicts. Costs
increase with the probability that the firm will be dominated by a single
investor or group of investors, in the case of common stockholders, or by
another class of investors in the case of bondholders, thus giving the firm
an undiversified demand for a set of distribution and investment policies.
Costs also increase with the duration of the investment in the firm, be-
cause as duration increases so does the expected variance of events influ-
encing firm policies.71 Finally, the expected costs of opportunistic
behavior, of wealth transfers between groups or classes of investors, are
also a function of the open nature of the investment contract.72 Thus,
short term investments that specify outcomes under all contingencies are
less subject to such risk, as in the case of trade creditors or short term
notes with fixed payment obligations. Residual claims of an indefinite
nature, such as shares of common stock or common stock options or
warrants, in firms with no specific rules constraining the power of domi-
nant investors, are the most subject to such risk.
As noted above, an investor who chooses distribution and risk policies
that deviate from the mean will incur search and transaction costs in
order to maintain an optimal portfolio. Because disagreements can occur
repeatedly in any firm, and with respect to all of the securities held in a
portfolio, avoidance of such repeated adjustments through one-time con-
tracting costs for firms may be efficient. Investors and firms will choose
to incur transaction costs by entering into such contracts to the extent
that marginal gains from contracting exceed the marginal costs of con-
tracting.73 Contracting by a firm is a one-time event for a security that
71. See supra note 64.
72. This can be expressed as:
Cc = F [(d +l)o]
where: Cc = the present value of expected coordination costs
d = probability of dominance, and
1 = length of investment period
with residual claims, lacking any specific termination date, as the longest possible pe-
riod, and
o = the open nature of an investment contract.
The greater the specification of outcomes under different contingencies, the lower the expected
coordination costs. No fully contingent contracts can be expected for any investments except those
of the briefest duration. Cf Klein, supra note 64, at 1562.
73. Thus even fully diversified investors will find it useful to expend resources on contractual
resolution of conflicts up to the point where the marginal cost of contracting equals the marginal
savings in expected portfolio adjustments resulting from conflicts. These savings must also be ad-
[Vol. 65:1
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may be outstanding for many years, and held by a variety of investors.
Thus scale economies suggest that contracting plays an important role
even in publicly held firms.
B. The Coordination Costs of Joint Ownership: A Taxonomy
In the following sections I analayze the effects of coordination costs by
describing the general types of conflicts among co-investors. In each case
the discussion focuses first upon conflicts and costs that exist whenever
there is multiple ownership of a firm. I next examine the behavior of a
dominant owner in a firm with minority investors. Conflicts involve only
two types of firm decisions: (1) distributions versus firm investments,
justed to present value, which suggests that contractual expenditures in publicly held firms may be
relatively modest. Scale economies and standardization of contract terms may nevertheless produce
elaborate contracts to reduce the cost of conflicts. A familiar model from tort theory illustrates the
extent of contract. Assuming that contracting introduces no costs beyond the transaction costs of
reaching agreement (e.g., that no increases in agency costs are incurred, and the firm loses no flexi-
bility in responding to future changes in conditions), the cost of contracting will rise constantly with
the level of restrictions imposed, as a ray from the origin. The cost of portfolio adjustments is
negatively sloped, but the curve declines at a decreasing rate to reflect declining marginal returns
from contracting. The efficient contracting level is illustrated in Figure I below:
Cost PC
C* Extent of
Contracting
Figure 1
Where: TC = Total Costs,
CC = Contracting Costs,
PC = Portfolio Shift Costs, and
C* = the optimum point where TC is minimized.
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and (2) the riskiness of new firm projects. Conflicts may involve mem-
bers of the same class of investors, or holders of different classes of secur-
ities. Changes in investor preferences, often incident to changes of, or
opportunistic behavior by, a dominant shareholder or representatives of a
single class able to control firm choices, such as common stockholders,
generate disputes.
C. Distribution and Investment Choices
All firms face continuing choices concerning the distribution of cash
flows. A firm may select policies ranging from total reinvestment to total
disinvestment and ultimate liquidation. These choices affect investors
personally, either by limiting their personal investment choices (as in the
case of total reinvestment by the firm); requiring new investment choices
(as in the case of disinvestment, or distribution of cash flows and liquida-
tion); limiting consumption choices (if investors do not wish to incur the
transaction costs of selling investment units during periods of reinvest-
ment); or requiring investment liquidations (where investors require cur-
rent cash flows). Any of these outcomes can impose costs on some
investors in the firm.
An examination of the general nature of conflicts among investors sug-
gests elaboration of contract provisions as diversification provides weaker
protection and as scale economies allow greater specification.
L Timing and Rate of Distributions
a. General Conflicts
i. The Diversity of Investor Preferences
The diversity of investor preferences can hardly be gainsaid; it is best
illustrated by the panoply of investment instruments made available in
capital markets. Distribution policies range from: assessable limited
partnership interests, where projects are developed in stages; warrants
that anticipate further financing; zero payout instruments, such as zero
coupon bonds that pay no interest until maturity; and common shares in
firms that announce an intent to pay no dividends, to high yield corpo-
rate debt and cash flow investments in wasting asset enterprises, such as
oil and gas investments. Some corporations, such as utilities, frequently
make dividend distributions on common stock that include a return of
capital. Such policies often require regular trips to the capital markets
[Vol. 65:1
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for refinancing.74
Without excluding agency cost explanations, this diversity is also re-
sponsive to the needs of a variety of investors. Preferences may vary on
the basis of the age of investors. Investors, for a variety of reasons, may
prefer a policy calling for the reinvestment of all earnings. For some
investors, current income may be sufficient to satisfy current needs. Thus
a policy of firm reinvestment may reduce their transaction costs. 75 The
tax advantages of long term capital gains over ordinary income reinforce
such a preference.76 Other investors, such as retirees or those who need
capital for alternative investments, may prefer current distributions of
the firm's entire cash flow, or even speedy liquidation, in order to meet
current needs.
Preferences may also vary depending on the legal structure of the in-
vestor. Trustees, for example, may prefer a policy that pays out all true
earnings while preserving the purchasing power of the capital invested in
the firm, because of their obligations to different classes of beneficiaries
with respect to income and principal.77 Corporate investors, on the other
hand, may well be indifferent as between dividends and reinvestment,
either because they consolidate returns or because of the eighty-five per-
cent intercorporate dividend deduction that eliminates most of the tax
cost of dividends.78
Though financial theory teaches that investors should generally be in-
74. Cf Jensen & Smith, supra note 15, at 119 (citing Smith, Corporate Dividend Policy: An
Analysis of Dividend Reinvestment Plans, (unpublished manuscript, Univ. of Rochester, 1983); Eas-
terbrook, Two Agency-Cost Explanations of Dividends, 74 AM. ECON. Rav. 650 (1984).
75. Investors currently receiving income at levels above their expected lifetime average will
have a stronger preference for saving (and reinvestment), according to Modigliani's Life Cycle Hy-
pothesis of Saving, supra note 16.
"76. Under progressive income taxation, those investors currently experiencing above average
earnings will also be experiencing above average rates of taxation, and will have stronger preferences
for tax deferral or avoidance. Subject to taxes on preferences, long-term capital gains have recently
been taxed at 40% of the taxpayer's ordinary income tax rate, which applies to dividends received.
I.R.C. § 1202(a) (1982). While tax reform legislation has eliminated the distinction in rates between
ordinary income and capital gains, it has not eliminated the deferral of recognition of unrealized
capital appreciation.
77. See generally III A. ScoTr, Scorr ON TRUSTS, Sec. 232 (3d ed. 1967); G. BOGERT, Bo-
GERT ON TRUSTS, Sec. 816 (2d rev. ed., 1981).
78. Dividends paid by one corporation to another within a related "group" able to consolidate
their tax returns are free of separate taxation as income. 1 PEEL, CONSOLIDATED TAX RETURNS
§§ 2.04, 15.01 (3d ed. 1984). Dividends paid by an unrelated corporation to another corporation are
subject to an 85% dividends received deduction. I.R.C. § 243 (1978). Where the acquisition of
stock is debt financed by the corporate owner, the deduction is reduced under I.R.C. § 246A (West
Supp. 1985).
1987]
Washington University Open Scholarship
28 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 65:1
different as to the choice between dividends or reinvestment, because of
their ability to "home make" distributions through sales of shares or bor-
rowings against them, this theory ignores the transaction costs of such
adjustments for individual investors.79 Brokerage fees, interest on bor-
rowings, and search costs to determine which investment to sell and
where to invest proceeds in excess of those needed for the moment are
not trivial. If investors know their future cash needs, they will probably
select securities with distribution and reinvestment policies matched to
those needs, in order to reduce these transaction costs.
ii. The Impact on the Firm
Diversity of investor preferences predicts only that markets will offer a
variety of financial instruments, not that single firms will do so. Coordi-
nation costs provide a large part of the explanation for complex capital
structures. Where all interests in a firm are held by a single claimant,
firm distribution and investment policies can be expected to adjust to
changes in the owner's circumstances and preference in order to maxi-
79. Dividends remain a puzzle to economists. R. BREALEY & S. MYERS, supra note 37, at 336-
350; Jensen & Smith, supra note 15, at 119-120; Black, The Dividend Puzzle, 2 J. PORTFOLIO MGT. 5
(1976); Black & Scholes, The Effects of Dividend Yield and Dividend Policy on Common Stock Prices
and Returns, 1 J. FIN. ECON. 1 (1974); and Easterbrook, supra note 74. The puzzle began with the
assertion that dividends are irrelevant to investors, because they can "home-make" their own, either
by selling shares or borrowing against them. Miller & Modigliani, Dividend Policy, Growth, and the
Valuation of Shares, 34 J. Bus. 411 (1961); Miller & Modigliani, The Cost of Capital, Corporation
Finance and the Theory of Investment, 48 AM. ECON. REV. 261 (1958); Stiglitz, On the Irrelevance of
Corporate Financial Policy, 64 AM. ECON. REv. 851 (1974). An alternative view argues that divi-
dends provide investors with useful signals, because investors prefer stable dividend policies, and
management will not commit new earnings to dividends unless it is certain that it can sustain an
increased payment for an indefinite period. Bhattacharya, Imperfect Information, Dividend Policy,
and the "Bird in the Hand" Fallacy, 10 BELL. J. ECON. 259 (1979); Ross, The Determinants of
Financial Structura" The Incentive Signalling Approach, 8 BELL J. ECON. 23 (1977). Easterbrook,
supra note 74, criticizes this view, and argues instead that dividends have value because they signal
to potential investors in common stock: (1) that the firm will not accumulate earnings and reduce
risk for bondholders beyond the level contracted for, and (2) that the firm will undergo the scrutiny
of capital markets by seeking new funds for investment. Recently De Alessi and Fishe, supra note
20, have argued that regular dividends control agency costs by inter alia reducing the cost of ob-
taining control of the firm and by reducing the chances of opportunistic behavior at the expense of
stockholders. That debate is not critical to this article, which simply assumes that investors desire
distributions, a position supported by the evidence, without asking why. De Alessi and Fishe ob-
serve that regularly scheduled dividends serve an important function for investors in reducing trans-
action costs, which is perhaps the most significant observation in this field for the purposes of this
article.
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mize the owner's expected utility over time." Individual investors, like
sole owners, may experience variations in income received from other
sources, or in their preferences for current versus future consumption
and investmeent. At certain times the personal utility of current cash
distributions will rise dramatically for individual investors, compared to
the utility of later benefits from firm reinvestment. 81 Under these condi-
tions investors experiencing such variations would prefer that the firm
follow a distribution policy that compensates for other variations in their
income, and adjusts to changes in their demand for current versus future
consumption. A transfer of investment units in the firm to investors with
different preferences can change demand for firm distributions and in-
vestments. s2 The sale of a majority of the interests (or a controlling inter-
est) in the firm to a new owner can change such policies radically.
In closely held enterprises, because the firm faces only a few demands
for distributions and investments, a few transfers of ownership claims can
radically alter aggregate demand. When ownership claims and these de-
mands are not diversified against changes in investor demand, co-owners
should have an incentive to exert some control over changes in the iden-
tity of owners. This explains the fact that restrictions on the transfer of
shares are a common feature of the closely held corporation. It also ex-
plains why partnership law generally prohibits the admission of new
partners without the consent of existing owners. 83
In closely held firms where decision agents are also the sole owners a
80. For a description of how individuals choose between current and future consumption and
savings, see STIGLER, supra note 17, at 276-86.
81. Modigliani's Life Cycle Consumption Hypothesis, supra note 16, predicts that individual
savings rates will change radically as individual income varies from the individual's expected lifetime
average. In addition, the marginal utility of alternative investment opportunities may increase from
time to time. Thus investments such as purchasing a new home or educating children may shift the
individual's preference away from one set of investments toward another. Similarly, the marginal
utility of certain consumption activities may rise dramatically from time to time, such as unexpected
medical expenses.
82. See, e.g., In re Franchard Corporation, 42 S.E.C. 163 (1964), where the SEC held that a
violation of the registration provisions occurred because a prospectus failed to disclose the tight
financial circumstances of the dominant owner of a firm, which gave him an incentive to pursue high
rates of distributions from the firm. See also Nelkin v. H.J.R. Realty Corp., 25 N.Y.2d 543, 307
N.Y.S.2d 454, 255 N.E.2d 713 (1969) (three tenants of building purchased it through a corporation
and agreed to charge themselves uniform below-market rents that eliminated company profits; when
one tenant moved, he attempted to dissolve the firm on the grounds that the other shareholders were
wrongfully diverting profits. The court denied dissolution.)
83. See generally I F. O'NEAL, supra note 26, at ch. 7 (stock transfer restrictions) and UNIF.
PARTNERSHIP ACT, § 18(g) (requiring consent of all the partners for admission of a new member in
the absence of partnership agreement to the contrary).
19871
Washington University Open Scholarship
30 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
diversity of demands for distributions can be partially satisfied through a
complex capital structure. The use of debt to control total firm distribu-
tions has both positive and negative aspects. Interest payment obliga-
tions, for example, assure certain minimum payouts by the firm, while
bank loan agreements may place ceilings on total distributions. Owners
of closely held firms can assure themselves of a desired mix of distribu-
tions by holding varying combinations of debt and equity-a "home-
made" dividend policy, in effect. One would expect to see owners in
closely held firms holding several classes of claims against the same firm,
a phenomenon that is less likely for holders of publicly traded securities.
When owners are also agents, stability of distribution policies is at least
partially assured through wage and salary payments made pursuant to
employment agreements.84
A publicly held firm, where ownership is widely dispersed, faces a mul-
titude of such individual demands, which results in full diversification of
these changes for the firm. In efficient capital markets, where investors
hold rational expectations firms will attempt to minimize the costs
caused by such investor conflicts. Because shifts in distribution and in-
vestment decisions cause some investors to make costly portfolio
changes, firms have incentives to reduce aggregate coordination costs by
assuring investors of stable policies.85 Under normal conditions it will be
less costly for individual investors experiencing shifts in their own de-
mands to make portfolio adjustments. This enables the majority of inves-
tors to pursue a "buy and hold" strategy. As a result, firms will be
reluctant to change their policies unless a relatively permanent shift in
the firm's circumstances occurs.86
b. The Complications of a Dominant Investor
In many firms no dominant investor can be identified. This will be
true of all firms where no investor, either alone or in concert with others,
is able to exert a decisive influence over firm actions. The SEC defines
"control" as the ability to direct or to cause the direction of the manage-
84. 1 F. O'NEAL, supra note 26, § 6.02 (1971).
85. For a description of the reasons why various firms would vary the nature of their payments,
see De Alessi & Fishe, supra note 20. These authors suggest that firms experience life cycles, from
promotional stages, when all available investments are positive net present value projects, to more
mature stages, when such projects are generally not available. They also note that some firms are
single project undertakings, where all cash flow is intended to be paid out periodically, while other
firms face more complex sets of investment opportunities.
86. See De Alessi & Fishe, supra note 20.
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ment and policies of an entity, an open and fact-based definition.87 No
better definition can be offered here.
Dominance generally depends upon the following factors: the percent-
age of a class of ownership claims held by a single investor; the ability of
holders of that class of claims to alter firm policies; the relative dispersion
of the remaining ownership units; the transaction costs of creating coali-
tions; and the voting rules in effect for a particular decision.88 Even
within a single firm an investor may be dominant for some purposes and
not for others. Thus, when there are scale economies in coalitions, a
87. Securities Act Rule 405, 17 C.F.R. See. 230.405 (1986); Securities Exchange Act Rule 12b-
2, 17 C.F.R. See. 240.12b-2 (1986).
88. See generally L. Loss, FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES REGULATION, 445-47 (1983).
Common stock, for example, may not dominate dividend decisions if dividends are prohibited by a
bond indenture. The concept of a dominant stockholder appears at least as early as A. BERLE & G.
MEANS, supra note 1, at 235-36. Dominance is a positive function of the percentage of control held
by a single owner, and of the dispersion of the remaining interests. Dominance is a negative function
of the costs of coalition on the particular vote and the height (restrictiveness) of the applicable
decision rule. But see AM. L. INST., PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS, § 5.02 (Ten. Draft No. 3, 1984), which defines a "dominating shareholder" in
the same general manner as this paper, but treats a 51% shareholder as dominant for all purposes,
regardless of voting rules for particular transactions. The official comments, however, appear to take
back what the definition claims:
However, where because of restrictions in a corporation's charter or because of contractual
restrictions imposed upon voting rights, a holder of more than 50 percent of the outstand-
ing voting securities is entitled to elect less than a majority of directors and where there is
clear and convincing evidence that the shareholder did not in fact otherwise exercise con-
trol under Sec. 5.02(2), it is not intended that such shareholder will be a dominating share-
holder simply because of the size of his shareholdings.
Id. at 93-94.
When supermajority voting rules reduce the power of a majority shareholder to effect a desired
transaction, the ALI reporters argue that any shareholder with a veto power may be dominant,
rather than admiiting that no one shareholder can dominate. ("A shareholder may be entitled by
reason of special voting rights to control approval of a particular transaction, even though the share-
holder does not possess general voting rights for the election of directors. Under such circum-
stances, the shareholder may be a dominating shareholder only with respect to the particular
transaction.") Id. at 94. This suggests that if one shareholder has a majority of the stock, but not
enough to approve a fundamental corporate change, and a second (minority) holder has "negative
control" or a veto power over the transaction, both are "dominant", in the sense that both can
preclude such transactions. Under these conditions, rather than follow the traditional rule that all
shareholders can vote their own interests, the ALI apparently imposes fiduciary duties on both
shareholders with respect to the transaction. The analysis of this paper suggests that neither share-
holder is dominant, since neither can unilaterally effect changes in firm distribution and investment
policies, or a wealth transfer. Exogenous changes may mean that a recalcitrant or holdout share-
holder may profit at the expense of a majority under some circumstnaces, but this does not fit this
paper's definition of dominance. Inability to change firm policies is simply a cost of restrictive deci-
sion rules. For a more general description of the transaction costs of group decisions, see J.
BUCHANAN & G. TULLOCK, supra note 15, at 106-109.
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dominant group may evolve. Repeated choices by co-investors on simi-
lar issues may provide such opportunities, because once formed, an in-
vestor coalition may be advantageous for repeated decisions.8 9 Voting
rule choices also affect dominance. When decision rules require unani-
mous consent, dominance is impossible, while dominance arises with rel-
ative ease when co-investors are apathetic and the applicable decision
rules require relatively low votes.90
Thus in a publicly held corporation a twenty percent shareholder may
have working control to elect the board of directors, given normal stock-
holder apathy about such matters. In such circumstances the dominant
stockholder will also control dividend policies, which are normally a
board prerogative.91 But that same twenty percent stockholder may lack
the voting power to authorize new shares (and thereby obtain the power
to make new investments in the firm), if a charter amendment is re-
quired, or to cause the firm to engage in other fundamental changes, such
as a takeout merger or a liquidation.92
i. The Effect of a Single Demand for Distributions and
Investments
The sole owner of a firm can be expected to maximize utility through a
mix of distribution and investment decisions that maximize the owner's
utility over time. In a one-owner firm, there is no reason to expect con-
sistency in firm distribution and investment policies.93 What is expected
is that the owner will be consistent in personal (rather than firm) con-
sumption and investment policies, absent exogenous changes in personal
circumstances, and that these policies will be adjusted to maximize per-
sonal utility over time in response to such changes. The sole owner will
89. For a general discussion of the costs of forming coalitions, see M. Olson, THE RISE AND
DECLINE OF NATIONS (1982). Well-known examples of the breakdown of coalitions of investors
abound in corporate casebooks. See, e.g., Abererombie v. Davies, 36 Del. Ch. 371, 130 A.2d 338
(Del. 1937) and Ringling Bros. Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. Ringling, 29 Del. Ch.
610, 53 A.2d 441 (Del. 1947).
90. For discussions of rational shareholder apathy in voting their shares, see Manne, Some
Theoretical Aspects of Share Voting, 64 COLUM. L. REv. 1427, 1439-43 (1964) and Easterbrook &
Fischel, Voting in Corporate Law, 26 J. LAW & EcON. 395 (1983).
91. A. BERLE & G. MEANS, SUPRA note 1; Sommer, Who's "In Control"?, 21 Bus. LAW 559,
569 (1966).
92. Generally such votes require approval of a majority of all shares, rather than a majority of a
quorum, as in the election of directors. See generally Carney, Shark Repellents, supra note 9, at 389-
90.
93. See note 16, supra.
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properly regard the firm as an "alter ego," and will transfer funds be-
tween owner and firm in order to maximize personal utility.94
Shifting control of a firm to a single owner gives the firm a single de-
mander of distributions. This will increase the expected variance in de-
manded distributions and reinvestments.95 The problem is exacerbated
because it is possible that the block of shares will be transferred as a unit
to yet another owner, who has a different demand schedule.
The solutions for the close corporation are well known: restrictions on
the transfer of equity interests; employment agreements guaranteeing
fixed salary payments; issuance of multiple classes of income securities to
equity holders; and the like.96 Some close corporations adopt special de-
cision rules to limit majority power, such as cumulative voting for direc-
tors, coupled with supermajority voting requirements for some or all
board decisions.
Shifts in distribution policies in publicly held firms (absent radical
changes in firm cash flows) appear to be relatively rare phenomena, even
in the presence of a dominant investor. This may result from a publicly
held firm's tendency to engage in a takeout transaction that eliminates
minority interests and the accompanying prospect of future conflicts over
these policies, once an owner obtains dominance.97 It may also result
94. The phrase "alter ego" is a judicial term of art, which indicates that a corporate firm is
operated as an agent that is perfectly responsive to its owners. Under these circumstances a court
may "pierce the corporate veil" and impose vicarious liability on the owners for the acts of the firm,
corporate rules of limited liability notwithstanding.
"To establish the alter ego doctrine it must be shown that the stockholders' disregard of
the corporate entity made it a mere instrumentality for the transaction of their own affairs;
that there is such unity of interest and ownership that the separate personalities of the
corporation and the owners no longer exist; and to adhere to the doctrine of corporate
entity would promote injustice or protect fraud."
1 FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA CORPORATIONS § 41.10 at 397 (1983 Perm. Ed.) (footnotes omitted).
95. See, eg., In re Franchard Corporation, supra note 82, (prospectus should have disclosed the
tight financial circumstances of the dominant owner of a firm, and his incentive to pursue high rates
of distributions from the firm). On the other hand, a shift in the business circumstances of the
minority stockholders can have the same impact. When the Dodge brothers, major shareholders in
Ford Motor Co., wished to begin a competing business, Henry Ford caused the Ford Motor Co. to
reduce its dividend rate drastically, thus cutting off a source of funds for the Dodge brothers to use
to finance their business. Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 204 Mich. 459, 170 N.W. 668 (1919). See
RIBSTEIN, BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS § 7.03[l], at 7-32 (1983). Although this decision was harmful
to the Dodge interests, it might still have been Kaldor-Hicks efficient if the gains to remaining share-
holders exceeded losses to the Dodge brothers.
96. See text at notes 83-84, supra. See also Jensen, supra note 52, at 15 (describing leveraged
buyouts as involving classes of debt and equity securities that are "stapled" together to reduce stock-
holder-bondholder conflicts).
97. See generally Carney, Business Purposes, supra note 59, at 100-108.
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from a dominant owner's desire to seek continued access to the capital
markets for equity investments in the firm. By observing the same policy
of consistency that widely held firms follow, the dominant owner can
reduce the cost of equity capital. Nevertheless, conflicts still arise in
some instances. A few examples illustrate the nature of the problem.
A shift in control to an investor in a higher income tax bracket than
previous controlling investors may reduce investor demand for taxable
distributions, and cause the firm's policies to shift toward reinvestment
and long-term capital gains. In closely held firms, where several signifi-
cant shareholders have veto power over firm choices, any one of a series
of investors may have a form of negative control over decisions that af-
fect other investors.
98
A shift from individual to corporate ownership can have a dramatic
impact on dividend demand. An 85% intercorporate dividend deduction
takes most of the tax bite out of dividends for corporate owners, leaving
them subject to a much lower marginal tax rate than individual investors
on dividend income, which creates an accompanying stronger demand
for dividends. 91 Similarly, ownership by tax-exempt entities can affect
98. See, eg., Atlantic Properties, Inc. v. Commissioner, 519 F.2d 1233 (Ist Cir. 1975), where
the Internal Revenue Service imposed a punitive tax on a corporation for unreasonable accumula-
tions of earnings. Stock in the firm was divided into four equal holdings, with an 80% shareholder
vote (effectively, unanimous consent) required to approve any board action, such as a dividend. One
shareholder deadlocked the corporation by refusing to approve dividends, because he was in a high
tax bracket. The Court of Appeals sustained the imposition of the tax, because there was no corpo-
rate purpose for the accumulation. In a later suit, the other three shareholders recovered damages
from the recalcitrant shareholder. Smith v. Atlantic Properties, Inc., 422 N.E.2d 798 (Mass. App.
Ct. 1981). See also Gottfried v. Gottfried, 73 N.Y.S.2d 692 (Sup. Ct. 1947) (charging tax avoidance
by dominant shareholders was a motive for the failure to pay dividends). Even tax rate changes for
individuals can change the relative preference of a dominant stockholder for reinvestment or distri-
butions. Capital gains rates have historically been set at a fraction of an individual's marginal rate.
Thus, as marginal rates increase, if the capital gains percentage remains constant, the absolute differ-
ence between the two rates increases. See, e.g., Berwald v. Mission Development Co., 40 Del. Ch.
509, 185 A.2d 480 (Del. 1962), where a complaining shareholder charged that the corporation had
terminated dividend payments because the controlling stockholder, J. Paul Getty, was in such a high
income tax bracket that he was not interested in receiving dividends. These problems arise because
historically the highest marginal income tax rate facing individuals has been well above that facing
corporations. Under present tax laws, this problem does not arise for partnerships, because firm
income flows through to the individual partners in accordance with the proportions set out in their
agreement, or imputed to them by law. See generally I.R.C. §§ 701-761 (1982). Nor does it arise as
frequently for shareholders when the maximum marginal rates are 50% for individuals and 46% for
corporations. Id. at §§ I and 44. Compression of rates through tax reform that minimizes differ-
ences between investors' marginal rates will also reduce these conflicts.
99. I.R.C. § 243 (1978). See also note 78, supra. Although there is no indication of a shift in
control, such a conflict may well have been part of the basis for shareholder complaints of excessive
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the investor demand for distributions, because such investors will not
seek tax deferral. Indeed, under current tax laws certain foundations
must liquidate a portion of their portfolio (and thus "homemake" their
own dividends), if income and disbursements fail to attain specified mini-
mum levels.'" Evidence of private foundation demand for dividends
would provide further support for the hypothesis that home-made divi-
dends carry higher transaction costs than corporate dividends. Trustees,
faced with fiduciary responsibilities to life-income beneficiaries as well as
residual claimants on principal, may prefer a policy that pays out all true
earnings, and maintains a constant purchasing power for invested capi-
tal.1"' Under such a policy all real growth of the firm is financed with
new infusions of capital, rather than from reinvestment.
ii. Selective Changes in Rates of Distribution
Drastic reductions in firm distributions are a classic method of effect-
ing a "squeeze-out" of minority interests. 10 2 These reductions are often
selective and non-pro rata, especially in closely held firms, where part of
the distribution mix is frequently in the form of employment compensa-
tion." 3 Thus a dominant partner or shareholder may retain his or her
own position as a salaried agent of the firm, terminate the employment of
co-investors, and thereby reduce or eliminate those distributions that
were actually based on relative investments in the firm."o If investors
dividends in Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717 (Del. 1971). The dominant (97%) share-
holder, Sinclair, caused Sinclair Venezuelan Oil Company to pay out more than its current earnings
over a six year period, when Sinclair apparently needed cash for use elsewhere. Presumably Sinclair
was able to consolidate tax returns with its subsidiary, and eliminate all tax considerations for such
intracorporate dividend decisions. The court noted that it would only interfere with the judgment of
the board of directors if the dividend payments involved a conflict of interest, in the form of self-
dealing between parent and subsidiary. Because all shareholders were treated pro rata, the court
found no self-dealing.
100. "Private foundations" (defined in I.R.C. § 509) are subject to a tax of 15% on undistributed
income under Section 4942(a). To avoid incentives to invest in non-income producing assets, the
Code sets a minimum assumed income at 5% of the net market value of a foundation's non-charita-
ble assets. § 4942(e).
101. See note 77, supra.
102. F. O'NEAL & R. THOMPSON, OPPRESSION, supra note 59, at § 3.04. This is true despite the
fact that dividends must be paid pro rata on all shares. 11 FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF CORPORA-
TIONS § 5352 (1958 Rev. Vol.).
103. F. O'NEAL & R. THOMPSON, OPPRESSION, supra note 59, at § 3.06. See also Trapkus v.
Edstrom's, Inc., 489 N.E.2d 340 (Ill. App. 1986) (majority shareholder caused firm to breach em-
ployment agreement with minority shareholder that was means of effecting 50-50 distribution of
profits).
104. Although rational investors will require both a market rate of compensation for their serv-
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perceive that they will not receive distributions for many years, they will
reassess the value of their investments to reflect the expected reductions
in cash flows. There have been charges of such tactics in publicly held
firms, although this story is usually told by co-owners of closely held
enterprises. 10 5 In closely held firms we can expect to see many of the
responses previously mentioned to curb majority power: stock transfer
restrictions, supermajority voting by directors, cumulative voting and
employment contracts that provide assurance that the salary portion of
distributions will continue. 10 6  In some cases regular distributions to
ices and for their investment, they will be indifferent about how it is paid under these circumstances.
See, eg., Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc., 370 Mass. 842, 353 N.E.2d 657 (Mass. 1976) (All
four shareholders agreed to share equally in the work and profits, and each drew an equal weekly
salary; no dividends were paid on any shares). When part of the salary represents a return on
invested capital, it is vulnerable to non-pro rata reductions. In Wilkes one of four investors was not
reelected to 'the board of directors, and was not reappointed by the new board as an officer, thus
eliminating his salary. See also Potter v. Brown, 328 Pa. 554, 195 A. 901 (1938), where a dominant
partner, who disagreed with his co-partners about admission of a new partner, reduced the salaries of
the dissenting partners by 50%. In imposing special fiduciary duties on dominant shareholders in
close corporations, the Massachusetts Supreme Court noted the opportunities for oppression of mi-
nority interests:
The minority is vulnerable to a variety of oppressive devices, termed 'freeze-outs,' which
the majority may employ .... An authoritative study of such 'freeze-outs' enumerates
some of the possibilities: "The squeezers ... may refuse to declare dividends; they may
drain off the corporation's earnings in the form of exorbitant salaries and bonuses to the
majority shareholder-officers and perhaps to their relatives, or in the form of high rent by
the corporation for property leased from majority shareholders . . .; they may deprive
minority shareholders of corporate offices and of employment by the company...
Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., 367 Mass. 578, 328 N.E.2d 505, 513 (1975).
See generally, F. O'NEAL & R. THOMPSON, OPPRESSION, supra note 59; Note, Freezing Out Mi-
nority Shareholders, 74 HARV. L. REV. 1630 (1961). For cases raising complaints of the use of most
of these oppressive tactics, see White v. Perkins, 213 Va. 129, 189 S.E.2d 315 (1972) and Cole Real
Estate Corp. v. Peoples Bank & Trust Co., 160 Ind. App. 88, 310 N.E.2d 275 (1974) (dominant
shareholder paid herself a salary and expense allowance that exhausted corporate profits). Indeed,
where salaries are deductible by a corporation and dividends are not, owners will prefer salary pay-
ments to dividends.
105. This was essentially the charge in Schlick v. Penn-Dixie Cement Corp., 507 F.2d 374 (2d
Cir. 1974) and in Greenstein v. Paul, 400 F.2d 580 (2d Cir. 1968). In Southdown, Inc, v. McGinnis,
89 Nev. 184, 510 P.2d 636, 640 (Nev. 1973), the controlling shareholder pointed to its discontinua-
tion of dividends by the controlled firm as evidence that the subisidiary's shares had declined in
value. The court disagreed, noting that ability to pay was more important than actual payment. The
court was correct. Absent a negative signal, of either a squeeze-out or an adverse change in the
firm's expectations about future profits, a one-time change in dividend rates should not adversely
affect stock prices. Black & Scholes, supra note 79. See also, Berkowitz v. Power/Mate Corp., 135
N.J. Super. 35, 342 A.2d 566 (Ch. Div. 1975), which involved a one-step "going private" transac-
tion, where there were similar charges of maniuplation through high executive salaries that reduced
firm profits. Such changes, that negatively affect shareholder wealth, could be expected to reduce
stock prices.
106. See generally W. PAINTER, CORPORATE AND TAX ASPECTS OF CLOSELY HELD CORPORA-
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common stockholders may be assured by issuing either debt or preferred
stock to these investors in the same proportion as their stock holdings.1 o7
iii. Purchases of Assets
Dominant shareholders may also sell assets to the firm at inflated
prices, thus effecting disproportionate future distributions. This practice
is more common at the promotional stage in enterprises that anticipate
seeking public funds in the future. It may continue even after co-inves-
tors have been brought in, however, if a dominant investor retains con-
trol after going public.10 8 The fact that assets sold to the firm under such
circumstances frequently are difficult to value creates monitoring difficul-
ties for co-investors. Patents, copyrighted materials and trade secrets are
examples of intangible property, the value of which is uncertain until it is
tested in the market. Mining claims have been a favorite of many pro-
moters, because valuation difficulties persist until the properties have
been fully exploited by the firm, which may take years.109 Because firms
expect to acquire assets in the future, it is costly to prohibit all such
future acquisitions by contract, even from dominant shareholders, and
few such contracts are observed.
TIONS, 179 (2d ed. 19881); F. O'NEAL & R. THOMPSON, OPPRESSION, supra note 59, at § 8.07 (both
suggesting that employment contracts may assure steady income streams for investors in closely held
firms). Support for the conclusion that such payments are in fact part of the return on investment
rather than for services in many instances is provided by Internal Revenue Service charges that if
such "salary" payments are in excess of normal market rates for similar services, they are really a
disguised form of dividend. See Painter, supra, at § 5.3, and cases cited therein.
107. Cf I O'NEAL, supra note 26, § 2.13, at 78 (2d ed. 1971) (preferred stock). Oddly, the
author does not discuss the use of debt for the same purpose. But see W. PAINTER, supra note 106,
at Sec. 2.6 (use of debt to reflect unequal contributions but desire for equal control). A major prob-
lem for attorneys planning a complex capital structure for close corporations corroborates the hy-
pothesis that it is used to assure equity investors a steady cash flow and security against
opportunism. The Internal Revenue Service may attempt to treat debt as if it were in fact equity,
with the consequent disallowance of corporate interest deductions, and treatment of the payments as
dividends. Cf I HOOD, KURTZ & SHORS, CLOSELY HELD CORPORATIONS IN BUSINESS AND ES-
TATE PLANNING ch. 5 (1982).
108. See, eg., Old Dominion Copper Min. & Smelting Co. v. Lewisohn, 210 U.S. 206 (1908);
Old Dominion Copper Min. & Smelting Co. v. Bigelow, 203 Mass. 159, 89 N.E. 193 (1909) (promot-
ers contributed assets with basis of $1 million and received stock worth $3.25 million, on basis of
offering price to public); San Juan Uranium Corp. v. Wolfe, 241 F.2d 121 (10th Cir. 1957) (promot-
ers had no cost basis in mining leases sold to corporation).
109. See cases cited supra note 108. A maxim of the industry, imparted to the writer by a former
client, is that in the mining business, "you are either one foot away from a million dollars or a
million feet away from a dollar."
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iv. Share Repurchases as Selective Distributions
Dividend distributions must be pro rata to all shareholders of the same
class, 110 but no such rules restrict share repurchases. In general a corpo-
ration has the power to repurchase its own shares at any time, and in as
selective a manner as it may choose."' If no market exists for the shares,
the corporation may decline to repurchase from one who wishes to with-
draw from the enterprise while at the same time repurchasing from an-
other.' 12 Repurchases may be at prices that represent a disproportionate
distribution of firm assets to one investor. 113
Contracting has an obvious role where opportunistic behavor is con-
cerned. Bondholders can only diversify against the stockholder-bond-
110. 11 FLETCHER, supra note 94, § 5352 (1958 Rev. Vol.). The rule of equal treatment can be
altered if all shareholders agree to a change. Id. at 1106. This is also the rule in partnership law,
which provides for equal sharing in profits and losses in the absence of contractual arrangements to
the contrary. UNIF. PARTNERSHIP ACT § 18(a) (1914). Rules of equal treatment can be seen as
efficient "off the rack" standard form contract provisions, designed to reduce transaction costs by
providing a standard form rule that will satisfy most contracting parties without further
modification.
111. There is no statutory requirement of pro rata repurchases, nor a general fiduciary rule to
this effect. Brudney, Equal Treatment of Shareholders in Corporate Distributions and Reorganiza-
tions, 71 CALIF. L. Rnv. 1072, 1108 (1983) [hereinafter Equal Treatment]. Brudney points out that
fiduciary duties do impose some limits on repurchases in order to preclude a use of corporate assets
which favors insiders. Id. at 1108, n.11l. Some courts have nevertheless given management wide
latitude in repurchases. See, eg., Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985)
(issuer tender offer for its own shares that excluded a bidder for control approved); Kaplan v. Gold-
saint, 380 A.2d 556 (Del. Ch. 1977) (repurchase from dissident major shareholder); Cheff v. Mathes,
124 Del. Ch. 320, 199 A.2d 548 (Del. 1964) (repurchase directly from large shareholder at premium
over the market); and Kors v. Carey, 18 Del. Ch. 242, 158 A.2d 136 (Del. Ch. 1960) (repurchase in
market from major shareholder at premium).
112. Cf., Lewis v. H. P. Hood & Sons, Inc., 331 Mass. 670, 121 N.E.2d 850 (1954) (sustaining
the selective redemption of common stock from the plaintiff at book value, on plaintiff's retirement).
The Lewis court stated:
A shareholder is free to purchase or not as he pleases. He buys with an eye to invest-
ment and profit. But if he acquires stock on terms whereby his investment may be tempo-
rary and his profits short-lived he has assented in advance to such terms and we see no
reason why he may not do so. He gets what he bargained for and if the call provision is
exercised he is in no position to complain.
121 N.E.2d at 853.
But see, Greene v. E.H. Rollins & Sons, 22 Del. Ch. 394, 2 A.2d 249 (Del. 1938) (invalidating call
provisions for shares because they would allow expulsion of disfavored investors). Recently such
selective repurchases have come under closer judicial scrutiny. See, e.g., Donahue v. Rodd Elec-
trotype Co., 367 Mass. 578, 328 N.E.2d 505 (1975) (requiring close corporations to offer an equal
opportunity to all shareholders to resell) and Comolli v. Comolli, 241 Ga. 471, 246 S.E.2d 278
(1978) (same).
113. See Brudney, Equal Treatment supra note 11, at 1108.
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holder conflict at some positive cost. 114 The role of contract in this area
is well documented." 5 Further, even if diversification could provide a
complete and costless solution, investors have incentives to improve the
odds, and be on the winning side (as investors in dominant stockholders)
more often than on the losing side (as minority investors in firms with
dominant stockholders). 1 6
Shareholders in closely held firms may protect themselves from repur-
chases by decision rules which require shareholder approval and
supermajority voting, giving minority interests a veto power. Recently,
in the context of selective repurchases from raiders, some firms have
amended corporate charters to protect investors against the cost of such
repurchases."17 This appears to be a response, not to a dominant share-
holder problem, but to an agency cost problem, brought about by the
apparent desire of some managers to fend off all bidders for control, even
at the expense of all investors but one in the firm." 8
v. Claim Issuances as Selective Distributions
Smith and Warner have identified claim dilution as a major aspect of
the stockholder-bondholder conflict." 9 Claim dilution extends to the
dominant-minority shareholder conflict as well. Dilution occurs when
the firm issues new investment units at a price below what existing inves-
tors would have paid if offered the opportunity. 20 That dilution may
114. See text supra at notes 53-56.
115. But see McDaniel, Bondholders and Corporate Governance, 41 Bus. LAW 413 (1986) (con-
cluding that existing bondholders have suffered substantial losses due to dramatic increases in corpo-
rate debt in recent years).
116. This is subject to other costs incurred by entering into such contracts. If, for example, these
contracts deter transfers of control, investors incur the cost represented by a loss in discipline for
incumbent management from threatened takeovers. See note 57, infra.
117. See, eg., Proxy Statement of Mobil Corporation (Feb. 22, 1985), reprinted in 2 D. BLOCK &
H. PIrr, eds., HOSTILE BA'TLES FOR CORPORATE CONTROL 1985, 495, 514-15, 533-34.
118. But see Macey & McChesney, A Theoretical Analysis of Corporate Greenmail, 95 YALE L.J.
13 (1985) (offering a shareholder welfare explanation of some greenmail transactions).
119. Smith & Warner, supra note 12, at 118.
120. An extreme example appears in Katzowitz v. Sidler, 24 N.Y.2d 512, 301 N.Y.S.2d 470, 249
N.E.2d 359 (1969), where two of the directors voted to issue new shares at 1/8 of their book value,
with the two controlling shareholders purchasing their full complement while the third shareholder
refused to do so. This new issue was followed shortly by dissolution, and the distribution of much
larger sums to the two controlling shareholders. The court noted that when new shares are issued at
prices far below fair value in a close corporation, "existing stockholders who do not want to invest or
do not have the capacity to invest additional funds, can have their equity interest in the corporations
diluted to the vanishing point .... See also Bennett v. Breuil Petroleum Corp., 34 Del. Ch. 6, 199
A.2d 236 (1953) (allegations that majority offered shares at $.40 that were worth between $2.50 and
1987]
Washington University Open Scholarship
40 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 65:1
take the form of a sale of shares other than on a pro rata basis to existing
investors or in a public offering. This usually either causes a reduction in
the per share earnings, or prevents an increase in per share earnings from
a new project which is expected to be a positive net present value pro-
ject. '21 This produces an increase in the expected yield for favored inves-
tors, at the expense of the disfavored group.
Because managers generally have no incentives to shift wealth from
old to new investors in the firm, bargain purchases of shares are a prob-
lem only if there is a dominant investor. Even if an offering is formally
pro rata, the result may benefit the dominant shareholder if minority in-
vestors are unable to finance their purchases or market their right to
purchase in a brief time. In closely held firms with a dominant investor
that has exhibited a willingness to press its advantage, outsiders are un-
likely to pay a significant amount for such rights.'22 The value of new
$3.00). Claims by minority shareholders that directors have breached their fiduciary duty under
these circumstances are often complicated by difficulties in proving the value of closely held shares.
See, eg., Steven v. Hale-Haas Corp., 249 Wis. 205, 23 N.W.2d 620 (1946) (challenged sale at $10 per
share; evidence showed prior sales at $7, $10 and $12.50 per share, and expert testimony that were
currently worth $15).
121. Where the expected rate of return on newly invested funds is higher because the new project
is riskier, the non-participating investor may suffer no decline in per share earnings, while suffering a
loss in value because he is not compensated for the increased risk. Where the expected rate of return
on the new project is higher with no corresponding increase in risk, the non-participating investor
has been denied the opportunity to participate on a pro rata basis in the economic rents available to
the firm. This rationale appears to underlie the initial decision establishing preemptive rights. Gray
v. Portland Bank, 3 Mass. 364, 3 Am. Dec. 156 (1807).
122. New issues in closely held firms can be offered pro rata at a time when a minority share.
holder cannot finance an acquisition of more shares. See, eg., Browning v. C & C Plywood Corp.,
248 Ore. 574, 434 P.2d 339 (1967) (minority shareholder who received 32% interest required to
purchase new stock for $151,000 to maintain relative position in firm); Gord v. Iowana Farms Milk
Co., 245 Iowa 1, 60 N.W.2d 820 (1953) (directors breached their duty by failing to disclose the
diluting effect of a decision not to exercise preemptive rights); Gaines v. Long Mfg. Co., 234 N.C.
340, 67 S.E.2d 350 (1951) (plaintiff complained that he lacked funds to exercise preemptive rights,
and that result of his failure to buy his pro rata share of the offering would be to dilute his equity
from $59,000 to $790); and Hyman v. Velsicol Corp., 342 I11. App. 489, 97 N.E.2d 122 (1951)
(plaintiff complained that after a dispute and his resignation, firm issued shares at a time when other
shareholders knew he lacked funds).
The same fate can befall even a dominant shareholder in a publicly held firm who has lost control
over the board, due to a falling out. Tallant v. Executive Equities, Inc., 232 Ga. 807, 209 S.E.2d 159
(1974). Courts have sometimes rejected minority complaints on the ground that these owners could
resell any rights that they could not personally exercise. See, e.g., Jones v. Concord & M.R.R., 67
N.H. 119, 30 A. 614 (1892) and Greebaum v. American Metal Climax, Inc., 27 A.D. 2d 225, 278
N.Y.S.2d 123 (1967). This rationale ignores the difficulties in seeking investors for minority interests
in closely held firms. It also ignores the barriers to such sales imposed by the prohibition of unregis-
tered public offerings in both federal and state securities laws. The refusal to pay dividends may
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minority interests under these conditions is clearly subject to a minority
discount.
In other cases the dominant owner may be in a position to mask the
terms of the transaction, and make it difficult for co-owners to monitor
and to determine whether they have been the victims of a wealth transfer.
Assets exchanges that are difficult to value can also effect a bargain
purchase of shares.123  Mergers of enterprises owned by the dominant
owner may create similar opportunities, with the difficulties, in terms of
information asymmetries, scale economies and free-rider problems, that
accompany monitoring and challenges by individual investors."2 4
vi. Business Opportunities
Business opportunities are defined here as investment opportunities for
the firm, that promise higher yields in relation to risk than firm investors
can currently obtain elsewhere. Thus allocation of business opportunities
also allocates future cash flows to investors. To the extent that both risk
and return are implicated in such choices, they demonstrate the artificial
nature of the construction of this paper, which attempts to separate risk
and return for purely expository purposes. But regardless of how busi-
ness opportunity questions are categorized, they create the most difficult
problems for contractual protection. Implicit in the contract creating the
firm is an agreement that agents will be loyal to the firm. This agreement
allow a dominant shareholder to dilute minority interests by offering new shares pro rata, which the
minority may be disinclined to purchase because of the expectation that no dividends will be paid.
See, e.g., Tashman v. Tashman, 13 Misc. 2d 982, 174 N.Y.S.2d 482 (1958) (plaintiff did not wish to
participate in offer of new shares of $100 when book value was $600 because of his inability to secure
dividends).
123. See, e.g., note 108 supra.
124. One of the difficulties with appraisal statutes is that they value the firm in the hands of the
current management team, and provide no share of the gains from a transfer of control for target
shareholders, because of their requirement that the firm's value be measured "excluding any appreci-
ation or depreciation in anticipation of the corporate action .. " REV. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT
§ 13.01(3) (1984); see also DEL. CODE, tit. 8, § 262(b) ("exclusive of any element of value arising
from the expectation or accomplishment of the merger or consolidation." This approach was criti-
cized in Brudney & Chirelstein, Fair Shares in Corporate Mergers and Takeovers, 88 Har. L. Rev.
297 (1974). Statutory appraisal methods have been inconsistent with modem financial techniques.
See, e.g., Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983). Criticisms of the "Delaware Block"
method of appraisal appear in Schaefer, The Fallacy of Weighting Asset Value and Earnings Value in
The Appraisal of Corporate Stock, 55 S. CAL. L. REV. 1031 (1982); Fischel, The Appraisal Remedy in
Corporate Law, 1983 AM. B. FOUND RES. J. 985; and Comment, Valuation in the Context of Share
Appraisal, 34 EMORY L.J. 117 (1985).
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is enforced by fiduciary duties governing business opportunities. 125  If,
however, new capital must be raised to capture an opportunity, a domi-
nant investor may decline to invest through the firm in order to do so
personally. He may also prevent others from funding the firm's invest-
ment, at least where investor consent is required to raise new capital.126
Under these conditions firm agents, even if loyal to the firm itself rather
than to a dominant investor, are precluded from expanding the firm's
activities.127 A dominant investor will possess transaction-cost and scale
advantages when bidding for new opportunities similar to those pos-
sessed when bidding for firm assets. 128
Contractual protections against such behavior are not costless. The
transaction costs of writing a fully contingent contract covering future
business opportunities are high, and such a contract would increase firm
costs by restricting future choices. Accordingly, investors may prefer a
distribution of new investment units that avoids the development of a
dominant position, to the extent that this is less costly than other
choices.129 Preemptive rights, a principal form of protection against de-
125. See generally Brudney & Clark, A New Look at Corporate Opportunities, 94 HARV. L. REy.
997 (1981).
126. Thus, where a charter amendment is required to authorize new shares, a dominant investor
can render the firm incapable of raising equity capital to finance the purchase. Cf., Hannerty v.
Standard Theatre Co., 109 Mo. 297, 19 S.W. 82 (1891) (no breach of duty for dominant stockholder
to acquire business opportunity where firm was unable to raise funds). Deadlock in a 50-50 firm can
also frustrate a firm's ability to exploit business opportunities. Application of Vogel, 25 A.D. 2d 212,
268 N.Y.S.2d 237, aff'd, 19 N.Y.2d 589, 278 N.Y.S.2d 236, 224 N.E.2d 738 (1965) (option to
purchase leased property); Summers v. Dooley, 94 Ida. 87, 481 P.2d 318 (1971) (one partner may
not hire employee to expand business over objections of the other).
127. But see Brudney & Clark, supra note 125, at 1055-1060 (suggesting a presumed subsidiary
entitlement in parent-subsidiary situations).
128. See infra text accompanying note 136.
129. Consent restraints are a common device in closely held firms. Dominance in publicly held
firms may be avoided by imposing ceilings on the voting power of any one shareholder. Some pub-
licly held firms have recently amended their charters to achieve this result. Height Finance Corp.
has provided that for each share in excess of 10% of the firm's outstanding shares owned by a single
shareholder, voting power is reduced from one vote per share to one-tenth of a vote per share.
Banner & Finley, Shark Repellent Charter and By-Law Provisions in PLI, 15TH ANN. INST. SeC,
REG. 629, 667-678 (1983); WINTER, STUMPF & HAWKINS, supra note 48, 346-47. MCI Communi-
cations Corp. permits only one-hundredth of a vote per share in excess of 10%. Id. at 319-20. Such
ceilings do not appear to encounter resistance from the courts under corporation statutes. Provi-
dence & Worcester Co. v. Baker, 378 A.2d 121 (Del. 1977). The obvious objection to such rules is
that they exacerbate the problem of shareholder apathy and thus increase agency costs. Cf. Manne,
Some Theoretical Aspects of Share Voting, 64 COLUM L. REv. 1427 (1964) and Easterbrook & Fis-
chel, Voting in Corporate Law, 26 J. LAw AND ECON. 395 (1983). But see, Ratner, Government of
Business Corporations: Critical Reflections on the Rule of One Share, One Vote, 56 CORNELL L.
REV. 1 (1970). Ratner's analysis is flawed by its failure to account for the free rider problems
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velopment of dominant investors, appear to have value in both publicly
and closely held firms. In view of the general fungibility of investment
securities in efficient capital markets, this value poses something of a
puzzle. 130
2. Liquidating Distributions
a. General Conflicts
Liquidation is one end of a spectrum between complete reinvestment
of all firm cash flows and complete disinvestment, through a return of
capital. The sale of a firm to a third party also represents a liquidation
decision for the present owners of the firm. Even where the distribution
is pro rata, it raises in extreme form all of the conflicts raised by other
distribution decisions. The conflicts are exacerbated by the magnitude of
the distribution, and by the fact that liquidation is an irrevocable choice.
The difference between liquidation and other distribution decisions, how-
ever, is mainly one of degree rather than of kind. There are a few excep-
tions, however.
Liquidation may be a means of defeating the contract expectancies of
one class of security holders, such as the value of options to purchase
shares in the firm, when an increase in the value of the firm seems immi-
nent. 13' Holders of some classes of claims obtain their protection in the
created by such voting rules. Preclusion of dominance may, in addition to increasing agency costs
by reducing the probability of takeovers, increase shareholder monitoring costs, as Demsetz and
Lehn, 5upra note 9, suggest. Recently corporations have developed dual classes of voting shares to
diminish the voting power of large shareholders, and to discourage accumulation of dominant
blocks. See generally, H. DeAngelo and L. De Angelo, Managerial Ownership of Voting Rights: A
Study of Public Corporations with Dual Classes of Common Stock, 14 J. FIN. ECON. 33 (1985); R.
Gilson, Evaluating Dual Class Common Stock.- The Relevance of Substitutes, 73 VA. L. REV. 807
(1987); J. Gordon, Ties that Bond: Dual Class Common and the Problem of Shareholders Choice, 75
Calif. L. Rev. - (forthcoming, 1988).
130. Cf., Scholes, The Market for Securities; Substitution versus Price Pressure and the Effects of
Information on Share Prices, 45 J. Bus. 179 (1972).
131, Cf., Harvard Indus., Inc. v. Wendel, 178 A.2d 486 (Del. Ch. 1962) (dissolution defeated
seller's right to contingent securities). Fundamental corporate changes, either in the form of dissolu-
tion or merger, may defeat the conversion rights of the holders of debt securities as well. See, eg.,
Parkinson v. West End St. Ry. Co., 173 Mass. 446, 53 N.E. 891 (1899), where conversion rights of
bondholders were destroyed by a consolidation. In the words of Justice Holmes:
I . The bondholder does not become a stockholder, by his contract, in equity any more
than at law. [Citation omitted.] So, if the corporation which made the bond finds it for its
interest to go out of existence at or before the maturity of the obligation, the option given
to the bondholder will not stand in the way. The option gives him merely a spes, not an
undertaking that the corporation will continue for the purpose of making it good.
173 Mass. at 448, 53 N.E. at 892. See also, Broad v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 642 F.2d 929 (5th Cir.)
1987]
Washington University Open Scholarship
44 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 65:1
form of compensation for their loss of expectancies, as in call premi-
ums. 132  In some cases, such as where capital investments may be im-
paired for a class of preferred shares, voting rights may be accorded the
class, either by statute or contract.133 Voting rights, either as a class on
liquidation or to elect a majority of the board of directors in delinquency
situations, give the class a veto power over liquidations.
b. The Complications of a Dominant Investor
i. Scale Economies and Agency Costs
Most of the conflicts over liquidation decisions involve dominant in-
vestors."' Liquidation may allow a large investor to capture the ex-
pected value of a one-time increase in the value of the firm. In some
cases, the dominant investor may seek to purchase the firm's assets at
liquidation and use them to capture valuable business opportunities. 3 '
Reduced transaction costs in financing or the rapid timing required to
(en bane), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 965 (1981) (conversion rights destroyed by merger) and see gener-
ally, Bratton, The Economics and Jurisprudence of Convertible Bonds, 1984 Wis. L. REV. 667, 682.
Bratton observes that spin-offs of assets to shareholders reduce the value of conversion rights of
bondholders.
132. Smith & Warner, supra note 12, at 142, describe the function of call provisions for debt.
Similar provisions for redemption or liquidation premiums may protect the holders of preferred
shares. See BRUDNEY & CHIRELSTEIN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATE FINANCE, 239 (3d
ed. 1987).
133. See, eg., REV. MODEL BUSINESS CORP. AcT § 10.04 (1984) (providing for class voting
rights for classes of shares normally without voting rights when charter amendments with specified
effects on the class are proposed).
134. See generally, Ribstein, A Statutory Approach To Partner Dissociation, 65 WASH. U.L.Q.
(forthcoming, 1987).
135. See, eg., Page v. Page, 55 Cal. 2d 192, 10 Cal. Rptr. 643, 359 P.2d 41 (1961), involving the
dissolution of a partnership at will that had lost money for years, until the recent establishment of an
Air Force base nearby. Justice Traynor held that the statutory right of partners at will to dissolve at
any time must be exercised in good faith, and partners cannot act opportunistically with respect to
each other. The opinion stated that:
[I]f. .. it is proved that plaintiff acted in bad faith and violated his fiduciary duties by
attempting to appropriate to his own use the new prosperity of the partnership without
adequate compensation to his co-partner, the dissolution would be wrongful and the plain-
tiff would be liable.., for violation of the implied agreement not to exclude defendant
wrongfully from the partnership business opportunity.
359 P.2d at 45.
In other cases the California courts have held that the partnership was impliedly for the term
necessary for investors to be repaid. Vangel v. Vangel, 116 Cal. App. 2d 615, 254 P.2d 919 (1953);
Owen v. Cohen, 19 Cal. 2d 147, 119 P.2d 713 (1941); and Mervyn Inv. Co. v. Biber, 184 Cal. 637,
194 P. 1007 (1921). Courts generally hold that despite fiduciary duties, the right of partners in a
partnership at will to dissolve is absolute, and that dissolving partners have a right to bid on the
assets at their own sale. See, eg., Prentiss v. Sheffel, 20 Ariz. App. 411, 513 P.2d 949 (1973).
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seize the opportunity may provide dominant investors with advantages in
bidding for these assets.' 3 6 The time of sale may be critical. Where sev-
eral co-owners wish to bid for the assets, choice of a particular time for
sale may maximize costs for some competing investors while minimizing
them for others.137  The largest co-owner possesses a scale advantage.
He needs fewer funds to buy out all remaining co-owners than do com-
peting bidders.' 3 8 The transaction costs of assembling a new coalition of
investors to finance the buyout may be prohibitive for dispersed minority
interests when time is of the essence. Free-rider problems may also limit
the response of these investors, because those taking the initiative in seek-
ing financing have no assurance that their expenses will be shared unless
they are successful.
Agency costs are also a factor here. Investors who currently control
management already have agents to seek financing and to manage the
firm; others must secure them. If the dominant investor has also been
the manager of the firm and thus he possesses relatively scarce firm-spe-
cific skills, co-investors may be forced to expend considerable resources
in locating suitable substitutes.139 In other cases, dominant investors who
have participated actively in the control of the firm may possess valuable
human capital developed at firm expense, which they can now capture
through liquidation or, more recently, through a leveraged buyout."4
136. See, eg., Lebold v. Inland Steel Co., 125 F.2d 369 (7th Cir. 1941), where the parent steel
company caused the dissolution of a shipping company and the sale of its ships. The parent, which
owned 80% of the stock purchased the ships for $1,120,000. Im. at 372. No other bidders appeared
at the sale.
137. This is particularly true in close corporations, where co-owners are likely to know the per-
sonal financial situations of one another. The law of large numbers also makes it less likely in
publicly held firms, but in such firms a dominant shareholder may possess other advantages, such as
possession of a management team and scale economies in financing the purchase.
138. This may have been the complaint of the minority partner in Page v. Page, 55 Cal. 2d 192,
10 Cal. Rptr. 643, 359 P.2d 41 (1961), where, in addition to an equal capital account, the plaintiff's
wholly owned corporation held a $47,000 demand note of the partnership. The court noted that
"[t]he fact that plaintiff's wholly-owned corporation holds a $47,000 demand note of the partnership
may make it difficult to sell the business as a going concern." 359 P.2d at 444. See also Lebold, 125
F.2d 369.
139. This theme also appears in Page, supra, where the court noted, "[d]efendant fears that upon
dissolution he will receive very little and that plaintiff, who is the managing partner and knows how
to conduct the operations of the partnership, will receive a business that has become very profita-
ble .. " Page 359 P.2d 41, 44. See also In re Radom & Neidorff, Inc., 307 N.Y. 1, 119 N.E.2d 563
(1954) (music publishing business where one shareholder died and the survivor offered to buy out the
widow's half interest for one year's earnings, threatening to quit and start a competing business if she
refused).
140. I suspect that is part of the explanation for the conflict in In re Radom & Neidorff, Inc.,
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Problems of opportunistic dissolution of partnerships are frequently
minimized by specifying a fixed term for the life of the firm sufficient to
allow all participants to realize any benefits expected from the long-run
success of the enterprise. 141 Complex capital structures that give non-
controlling investors priority claims on assets in the early years of a
firm's life, coupled with options or warrants on residual claims triggered
by outcomes at the upper tail of expected outcomes can provide similar
protection for corporate investors. 142 Supermajority voting rules can also
limit the majority's power to dissolve the firm. Under some circum-
stances, mutual buy-out provisions can have the same effect, assuming
minority investors can readily finance a purchase and provide the neces-
sary human capital to continue the business.
A dominant investor who owns property that uniquely complements
that of the enterprise may be in a position to capture a disproportionate
share of the joint proceeds through a strategy of holding out for a high
price for the individually held assets.143 These situations may arise in
circumstances that do not involve the constraints of the business oppor-
tunity doctrine on agents. 1" Contracting is unlikely to be an efficient
method of limiting the bargaining power of such investors, because of the
high costs of writing fully contingent contracts. 145
ii. Takeout Mergers and Self-Dealing
While the foregoing discussion of dominant investors illustrates the
supra, where a 50% shareholder wished to dissolve a business with machinery and supplies worth
only $9500, but which averaged profits of over $70,000 per year. The owner wishing to dissolve was
the surviving founder, who offered approximately one year's earnings to the decedent's widow, and
threatened to start a competing business if she refused to sell, or if she purchased at a dissolution
sale. See also Patient Care Services, S.C. v. Segal, 32 Ill. App. 3d 1021, 337 N.E.2d 471 (1975),
where the service partner in a professional corporation threatened to dissolve the firm and deal
directly with their sole customer unless the absent partner agreed to sell his interest.
141. UNIF. PARTNERSHIP ACT § 31(1) specifies as a cause of dissolution "the termination of the
definite term or particular undertaking specified in the agreement." See generally 2 CAVITCH, Bus-
NESS ORGANIZATIONS WITH TAX PLANNING § 30.02. If a partner attempts to dissolve in breach of
the agreement to continue the partnership for a term, those partners who have not wrongfully dis-
solved are permitted to continue the business and to retain the wrongfully dissolving partner's eapi-
tal if they provide proper security. UNIF. PARTNERSHIP ACT, § 38(2)(B).
142. See generally, VENTURE CAPITAL AND PUBLIC OFFERING NEGOTIATION, 253-55 (Hal-
loran et al, eds. 1982) and 2 HAFr, VENTURE CAPITAL AND SMALL BUSINESS FINANCING §§ 1.01-
1.02 (1985).
143. See, e.g., Dravosburg Land Co. v. Scott, 340 Pa. 280, 16 A.2d 415 (1940).
144. See, eg., Farber v. Servan Land Co., Inc., 662 F.2d 371 (5th Cir. 1981).
145. RIBSTEIN, supra note 95, observes that some courts resist enforcing contract provisions that
vary from the standard form provided by the UNIF. PARTNERSHIP AT.
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difficulties present, even when distributions are formally pro rata, the
problem is exacerbated when these formalities are not observed. Under
these conditions liquidation may become a means for distributing valua-
ble firm assets to dominant investors to effect a bargain purchase, and
thus a disproportionate distribution. 146 Asset sales may in some cases be
private sales, where no competition is permitted. 147 A corporate merger
between a dominant stockholder and a subsidiary is in effect a private
sale. Squeeze-outs in closely held firms have long been the focus of an
extensive literature. 148 The advent of two-tier bids for corporate control
has dramatized the potential for conflicts between dominant and minor-
ity stockholders in publicly held firms. The development of the market
for corporate control has led to greater utilization of fundamental corpo-
rate changes such as mergers and recapitalizations both by existing domi-
nant shareholders, in leveraged buyouts, and by successful bidders, in
two-tier acquisitions. The squeeze-out that once seemed to be a unique
problem of the closely held firm has thus been introduced into public
securities markets. These transactions have generated considerable com-
mentary concerning the treatment received by minority stockholders.
149
146. Such bargain sales became the subject of litigation when majoritarian rules replaced rules
requiring unanimous consent. See, Marks v. Merrill Paper Co., 203 F. 16 (7th Cir. 1913); Wheeler v.
Abilene Nat'l Bank Bldg. Co., 159 F. 391 (8th Cir. 1908); Ervin v. Oregon Ry. & Nay. Co., 20 F.
577 (S.D.N.Y. 1884), 27 F. 625 (S.D.N.Y. 1886), appeal dismissed, 136 U.S. 645 (1889); Allied
Chem. & Dye Corp. v. Steel & Tube Co., 14 Del. Ch. 1, 120 A. 486 (1923); Kavanaugh v. Kava-
naugh Knitting Co., 226 N.Y. 185, 123 N.E. 148 (1919); Murrin v. Archbald Consol. Coal Co., 232
N.Y. 541, 134 N.E. 563 (1921); In re American Tel. & Cable Co., 139 Misc. 625, 248 N.Y.S. 98
(1931); Andrews v. Sumter Commercial & Real Estate Co., 87 S.C. 301, 69 S.E. 604 (1910); and
Theis v. Spokane Falls Gaslight Co., 34 Wash. 23, 74 P. 1004 (1904). These cases became the
subject of severe criticism. Horustein, Voluntary Dissolution-A New Development In Intracorporate
Abuse, 51 YALE L.J. 64 (1941).
147. Marks v. Merrill Paper Co., 203 F. 16; Wheeler v. Abilene Nat'l Bank Bldg. Co., 159 F.
391; Ervin v. Oregon Ry. & Nav. Co., 20 F. 577; Allied Chem. & Dye Corp. v. Steel & Tube Co., 14
Del. Ch. 1, 120 A. 486; Murrin v. Archbald Consol. Coal Co., 232 N.Y. 541, 134 N.E. 563; In re
American Tel. & Cable Co., 139 Misc. 625, 248 N.Y.S. 98; and Andrews v. Sumter Commercial &
Real Estate Co., 87 S.C. 301, 69 S.E. 604.
148. F. O'NEAL & R. THOMPSON, OPPRESSION, supra note 59; Matteson v. Ziebarth, 40 Wash.
2d 286, 242 P.2d 1025 (1952) appears to be the earliest case of a takeout merger with a subsidiary
created by a dominant shareholder expressly for that purpose. This has become the dominant
method in modern squeeze-out transactions. See generally, Carney, Business Purposes, supra note
59.
149. Most of the commentary takes an explicitly normative position that the treatment of minor-
ities is "unfair." See, eg., Bebchuk, Toward Undistorted Choice and Equal Treatment in corporate
Takeovers, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1693 (1985); Borden, Going Private-Old Tort, New Tort or No Tort?,
49 N.Y.U. L. REV. 987 (1974); Brudney & Chirelstein, Fair Shares in Corporate Mergers and Take-
overs, 88 HARV. L. REV. 297 (1974) [hereinafter Fair Shares]; Brudney & Chirelstein, A Restatement
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Although such transactions are subject to legal constraints on self-
dealing, enforcement is not costless. In some cases, the value of the as-
sets sold may be extremely difficult to determine. Thus, some co-owners,
facing the free rider problems of litigation, will be deterred from vigorous
monitoring. 150 In other cases, even if the inadequacy of price is detected,
problems of proof in the courts may deter litigation. Courts are generally
concerned more with historical financial data than with opportunity cost
and expected returns, which they often characterize as "speculative."
' 151
Appraisal, the usual remedy of shareholders dissenting from a merger or
sale of substantially all of the assets of the firm, is infrequently used. The
frequent attempts by plaintiffs at circumvention of the general rule of the
of Corporate Freezeouts, 87 YALE L.J. 1354 (1978); Brudney, A Note on "Going Private," 61 VA. L,
REv. 1019 (1975); Greene, Corporate Freeze-Out Mergers: A Proposed Analysis, 28 STAN. L. REV.
487 (1976); Lome, A Reappraisal of Fair Shares in Controlled Mergers, 126 U. PA. L. REv. 977
(1978); Toms, Compensating Shareholders Frozen Out in Two-Step Mergers, 78 COLUM. L, REV. 548
(1978); and Weiss, The Law of Take Out Mergers: A Historical Perspective, 56 N.Y.U.L. REV. 624
(1981). But see, Carney, Shark Repellents, supra note 9 and Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 2.
150. This indicates that the expected marginal gains from valuation are smaller than the margi-
nal costs. The problem is exacerbated by free rider and scale problems, and by problems of bounded
rationality. The potential gains from valuation by shareholders are unknown in advance, because
the assets are likely to be unique, and the valuation a one-time activity for the shareholder. Attor-
neys' fees are awarded only to successful plaintiffs. Stigler points out the problems of determining
the efficient amount of search by buyers when dealing with unique assets or entering new markets in
Stigler, The Economics of Information, 59 J. POL. ECON. 213, 216, 219 (1961).
151. This problem is illustrated by appraisal cases involving the value of firms when shareholders
have dissented from a merger, whether with a parent corporation or a third party. Until recently, at
least, the courts of Delaware have rejected earnings projections as speculative, and have relied on an
average of firm earnings for the past five years. See, e.g., Francis I DuPont & Co. v. Universal City
Studios, Inc., 312 A.2d 344 (Del. Ch. 1973). There is some indication that Delaware may be pre-
pared to abandon this antiquated approach and adopt a modern discounted cash flow methodology.
Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983). Furthermore, the "Delaware Block" method,
which is widely used by the courts and involves weighting prices determined by an asset valuation,
an earnings valuation, and market value, can be a disaster for dissenters. An example of the falllacy
of this approach appears in the DuPont case, where a fully depreciated film library was given zero
asset value, despite the fact that it had been leased for television use in the future, and thus possessed
proven earnings value. In this case earnings value was weighted at 87.5%, and asset value at 12.5%.
If the earnings value of the film library was $100 million, for example, this weighting process would
value it for appraisal purposes at $87.5 million, because the weighting process would proceed as
follows:
Value
Factor Value Weight Result
(in millions)
Earnings $100.00 87.5% $87.50
Assets 0.00 12.5% 0.00
Value of Asset $87.5U
The "Delaware Block" method is criticized at length in Schaefer, Fischel, supra note 124, at 890-
93 and Comment, supra note 124.
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exclusivity of the appraisal remedy, provide evidence of the high costs
and low expected payoffs from the remedy.' 52
iii. Contractual Responses
Given the difficulty of contractually specifying the expected future
value of the firm, it is not surprising that common shareholders rely to a
large extent on voting rules rather than other contract arrangements to
gain protection from the effects of dominance. Generally voting power
governing events such as liquidation is partially retained by the share-
holders rather than entirely delegated to agents, such as the board of
directors, who will be responsive to a dominant investor. 5 ' Only in the
past decade have large numbers of publicly held firms developed similar
contract responses to the takeout problem.' 54 These responses, denomi-
nated "shark repellents", generally provide a combination of
supermajority voting rules and "fair price" formulae that excuse such
requirements if specified conditions are met. 55 These responses demon-
strate the identity of dominant shareholder problems in close and pub-
licly held firms, and the role of contract rather than diversification in
reducing the expected costs of dominance.
Supermajority voting rules have commonly been employed in closely
held firms to restrain majority power. Similarly, participants in closely
held firms have used exit rights, such as "forced bid" provisions, that are
not dissimilar to redemption or forced bid rights in publicly held firms. 156
152. Criticisms of the remedy appear in Vorenberg, Exclusiveness ofthe Dissenting Stockholder's
Appraisal Right, 77 HARV. L. REv. 1189 (1964) and Brudney & Chirelstein, Fair Shares, supra note
149. Attempts to litigate the "fairness" of price in such transactions began in Delaware with Sterling
v. Mayflower Hotel Corp., 33 Del. Ch. 293, 93 A.2d 107 (Del. 1952) and ended with Weinberger v.
UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983). The latter opinion conceded the inadequacy of the valuation
techniques used in appraisal cases.
153. Originally liquidation was seen as a fundamental change in the nature of the contract
among the shareholders, requiring unanimous consent of all parties to the contract. Carney, Busi-
ness Purposes, supra note 59, at 77-82. Although this rule has been abrogated both judicially and by
statute, it remains the case that a sale of substantially all of the assets of a firm outside the ordinary
course of business usually requires a shareholder vote, which in many cases has been raised above a
bare majority by the charter. See, eg., REv. MODEL BUSINESS CORP. AcT § 12.02 (1984). See also
Easterbrook & Fischel, Voting in Corporate Law, supra note 129, at 415-417.
154. See generally Carney, Shark Repellents, supra note 9; Carney, Two-Tier Tender Offers
supra note 9; and Gilson, The Case Against Shark Repellent Amendments: Structural Limitations on
the Enabling Concept, 34 STAN. L. REV. 775 (1982) [hereinafter "Shark Repellents Amendments"].
155. See Carney, Shark Repellents, supra note 9.
156. Exit rights in closely held firms may include dissolution of partnerships, see note 26 supra,
or the right of dissident investors to be bought out. See generally 2 O'NEAL, supra note 26, Ch. 7
and W. KLEIN, supra note 22, at 87. Exit rights in the form of "forced bid" provisions for minority
1987]
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In each case contracts are designed to deal with essentially the same
problem.
Because the adoption of such shark repellent amendments is often ini-
tiated by firm agents, who are also motivated by a desire to obtain protec-
tion from hostile bids, agency and coordination costs once again become
interrelated.157 Managers who are loyal to firm investors have incentives
to produce contractual arrangements that reduce the dominant share-
holders' power to engage in opportunistic behavior. On the other hand,
disloyal managers have incentives to raise the costs of takeovers in order
to reduce the prospects of a change in control. 158 Assuming managers
operate as if they were loyal to investors, shareholders who do not expect
to obtain a dominant position may have incentives to adopt such ar-
rangements. It is in the interest of these shareholders to contractually
reduce the dominant owners' power to transfer wealth in all firms in
which they invest, if they can do so. 59
There is evidence that investors believe that the expected costs of dom-
shareholders of publicly held firms are generally triggered by a successful bid for control. Smith,
Fair Price and Redemption Rights: New Dimensions in Defense Charter Provisions, 4 DEL. J. CORP.
L. 1 (1978); WINTER, STuMPF & HAWKINS, supra note 48, at § 7.2, at 214; 1 A. FLEISCHER, supra
note 41, 37-38. In some cases exit rights take the form of "poison pills" which give minority share-
holders instruments other than their common stock that can be redeemed for cash after a change in
control. See, e.g., Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986)
(dividend of right to each stockholder to exchange one share of common stock for one target note
due in one year with principal value set at board's determination of the fair value of a target share).
157. See Carney, Shark Repellents, supra note 9 and Gilson, Shark Repellent Amendments, supra
note 154.
158. Gilson, A Structural Approach to Corporations: The Case Against Defensive Tactics in
Tender Offers, 33 STAN. L. REV. 189, 868 (1981).
159. Use of these fair price exemptions from restrictive decision rules is often conditioned on the
absence of self-dealing transactions preceding the takeout. See, e.g., Hochman & Folger, Deflecting
Takeovers: Charter and By-Law Techniques, 34 Bus. LAW. 537, 572 (1979); Proxy Statement of
Central Bankshares of the South, Inc. (May 17, 1982) in WINTER, STuMPF & HAWKINS, supra note
48, at 79; Proxy Statement of Dart & Kraft, Inc. (May 5, 1983) in Id. at 111; Proxy Statement of
Atlanta Gas Light Company, A-5 (Dec. 21, 1984). Contracting to reduce or avoid coordination costs
will occur to the extent that diversification does not provide a complete solution, and will be a
function of the magnitude of these costs. Thus:
K = F([1-D] Cc)
where: K = cost of contracting,
Cc = total coordination costs, and
D = diversification as a complete solution
Assuming that expected coordination costs are $100, and that diversification provides a complete
solution, investors will spend nothing on contracting. If, on the other hand, diversification is ex-
pected to reduce coordination costs by only 50%, investors will spend up to $50 on contracting to
avoid these costs. One cost of contracting, of course, is the possible deterrence of bids for control of
the firm. See text at note 167, infra.
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inance are real and substantial. That evidence provides a link between
the closely and publicly held firm, that was not apparent until recent
years. Complex contracts are a regular feature of closely held firms,
where diversification is most costly. 1" As the market for corporate con-
trol has developed publicly held firms have faced the same problems of
dominance as closely held ones."' Under these conditions firms will en-
gage in more costly contracting. Not surprisingly, contractual provisions
limiting the power of dominant stockholders have been regularly ap-
proved by large majorities in hundreds of publicly held firms. 162
Typical fair price charter amendments illustrate the nature of the con-
flict. These amendments impose extremely restrictive decision rules for
mergers with a dominant shareholder. Affirmative votes, often in excess
of two-thirds majorities, are required, with some ranging as high as
95%. 163 But these voting rules can be relaxed to the statutory minimum,
frequently a simple majority, if the consideration paid to minority share-
holders in the takeout merger is "fair." Fairness is typically set as a
minimum price based on several alternative formulae, including: the
highest price paid by the dominant shareholder for any shares of the
firm; the firm's earnings per share multiplied by the bidder's price-earn-
ings ratio, etc. 16
160. See generally HOOD, KURTZ & SHOS, supra note 107; F. O'NEAL, supra note 26; and W.
PAINTER, supra note 106.
161. See Carney, Shark Repellents, supra note 9 at 368, for a game theory analysis of the
problems presented by a dominant investor in a hostile takeover.
162. One study reports that from 1974-79 approximately 200 companies listed on the New York
Stock Exchange proposed corporate charter and by-law amendments designed to make the transfer
of control more difficult, principally by restricting the majority's power to set the terms of acquisi-
tion of minority interests in the firm. DeAngelo & Rice, Antitakeover Charter Amendments and
Stockholder Wealth, 11 J. FIN. ECON. 329 (1983). Another study, using NYSE listed companies in
the period 1960-1980, found at least 475 charter or by-law amendments by 398 companies. Linn &
McConnell, An Empirical Investigation of the Impact of 'Antitakeover' Amendments on Common
Stock Prices, 11 J. FIN. ECON. 361, 367 (1983). A more recent study included 649 firms (approxi-
mately two-thirds of which were listed on exchanges) that adopted "shark repellent" amendments,
generally to restrict the terms of second-stage mergers. JARRELL, SHARK REPELLENTS AND STOCK
PRICES: THE EFFECTS OF ANTITAKEOVER AMENDMENTS SINCE 1980: A STUDY OF THE OFFICE
OF THE CHIEF ECONOMIST, SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION (1985).
163. De Angelo & Rice, supra note 162, at 331, found some shark repellents with supermajority
requirements as high as 95%. JARRELL, supra note 162, at 7 (1985); an unpublished study by the
Office of the Chief Economist, Securities and Exchange Commission (1980), found voting require-
ments ranging from two-thirds to as high as 90 percent. Generally, however, these requirements are
set between two-thirds and 80%. See, e.g., 2 FLEISCHER, supra note 41, at 615 (1985 Supp.); see
also, Hochman & Folger, supra note 159, at 553-54.
164. See, eg., Proxy Statement of Control Data Corporation (May 3, 1978), in WINTER, STUMPF
& HAWKINS, supra note 48, at 87 ("the highest per share closing public market price for such
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In order to prevent a dominant shareholder from using its power to
manipulate any of the formulae, these amendments often relax voting
rules only if the dominant shareholder has not engaged in a variety of
specified self-dealing transactions since becoming a dominant share-
holder.165 Recently popular "poison pill" plans often provide for the
bargain purchase of shares, either of the target or of the successful bidder
after a merger, if a similar series of specified self-dealing transactions
have been undertaken by a dominant shareholder.166
An agency cost explanation has been advanced to explain these con-
tracts-that managers have systematically deceived investors into ap-
proving management entrenchment provisions against takeovers.167
Although that explanation cannot be rejected entirely, the model sug-
gests that at least some, perhaps the less restrictive, of these contracts can
serve a cost-reducing function for investors. 68
This model suggests an important role for coordination costs in ex-
Common Stock during such five year period, plus (b) the aggregate amount, if any, by which five
percent for each year, beginning on the date on which such Controlling Person became a Controlling
Person, of such higher per share price exceeds the aggregate amount of all Common Stock dividends
per share paid in cash since the date on which such Person became a Controlling Person."). See also,
Article Nine of Sabine Royalty Corporation's Articles of Incorporation, reprinted in I LIPTON &
STEINBERGER, TAKEOVERS AND FREEZEOuTS, 267-68 (1978) (fair price must be the greatest of the
same percentage premium over the pre-takeout market price as was the cash tender offer to the pre-
bid market price, or the highest price paid by the bidder for any target shares, or the last four
quarters' earnings multiplied either by 15 or the bidder's price-earnings ratio).
165. See, supra note 159.
166. See Moran v. Household International, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1986) (upholding use of
flipover rights plan); Horwitz v. Southwest Forest Indus., 604 F. Supp. 1130 (D. Nev. 1985) (up-
holding rights plan); Minstar Acquiring Corp. v. AMF Inc., 621 F. Supp. 1252 ($.D.N.Y. 1985)
(invalidating a put plan under New Jersey law); and Dynamics Corp. of America v. CTS Corp., 805
F. 2d 705 (7th Cir. 1986), reversed on other grounds, 107 S. Ct. 1637 (1987) (invalidating a put
plan). See generally, Comment, Protecting Shareholders Against Partial and Two-Tiered Takeovers:
The 'Poison Pill Preferred,' 97 HARV. L. REV. 1964 (1984).
167. See Gilson, Shark Repellent Amendments, supra note 154. I do not dispute the possibility
that the agency cost explanation has power; I only assert that alternative and more benign possibili-
ties also exist.
168. Thus investors may trade coordination costs for agency costs. Carney, Shark Repellents,
supra note 9. Managers seeking capital in efficient capital markets facing investors with rational
expectations will attempt to minimize total firm costs, which consist of the sum of agency costs and
coordination costs. Assuming that reductions in coordination costs increased agency costs (which
may be true for some types of coordination costs, but not all of them), we would expect a negative
correlation between agency and those coordination costs. Agency and coordination costs would be a
function of the severity of those shark repellents that affected them. Thus, we can express the rela-
tionship as follows:
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol65/iss1/2
1987] INVESTOR COORDINATION COSTS
plaining a firm's ownership structure and related contract provisions.' 69
Ultimately it can be tested by examining the incidence of costly capital
structures and investor contracts in firms where agency costs are rela-
tively low. No agency cost explanation of the presence of costly con-
tracts seems persuasive for closely held firms, where similar provisions
often exist. 170 The lack of universality undermines the agency cost expla-
nation, and lends credence to the coordination cost story.
C = f(s) = Cc(S) + Ca(s)
where: S = severity of charter provisions,
Cc = total coordination costs, and
Ca = total agency costs
If the optimum point, C* is a unique minimum of the sum of Cc(S) and Ca(S), where the slope of
Cc = 0, then:
dC = dCc + dCA = 0
ds ds ds
and: dCc = - dCA
ds ds
The relationships can be depicted graphically as shown in Fig. 2:
kT C
Cost r"1Z
C* Severity of Charter
Provision
Figure 2
169. Carney, Two Tier Tender Offers and Shark Repellents, supra note 9.
170. The agency cost explanation thus has limited power, because it fails to explain the presence
of supermajority voting rules in closely held firms. See, e.g., Benintendi v. Kenton Hotel, 294 N.Y.
112, 60 N.E.2d 829 (1945), and Katcher v. Ohsman, 26 N.J. Super. 28, 97 A.2d 180 (N.J. Super.,
Ch. Div., 1953).
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D. Investment Decisions: Risky Choices
L General Conflicts
Investors can also be distinguished on the basis of their relative prefer-
ences for risk. Some of these differences are explained by matters such as
age, current income, wealth, level of diversification, and the like, though
others may be purely idiosyncratic. 171 Investor preferences in any single
firm are subject to change over time. Even if a group of investors were in
agreement on appropriate distribution, reinvestment, and risk policies at
the time they purchased common stock in a firm, exogenous events can
disrupt this equilibrium.
Introduction of new complexities in the firm's capital structure may
signal changes in firm preferences for risk. For example, introducing
debt shifts stockholder preferences toward riskier policies. Changes in
relative wealth of co-investors may have a similar effect. Furthermore,
not all common stockholders will have identically sloped marginal utility
curves for wealth. Thus investors may have different preferences with
respect to the degree of increase in risk, even though they agree on the
direction of the change. Changes in firm wealth, and derivatively in own-
ers' wealth, may have similar effects in closely held firms.
In close corporations the need to obtain new financing may provide a
contractual means for controlling these conflicts. Authorization of new
partnership units, assessment of partners or authorization of new shares
may be necessary in order to finance a new project. Decision rules can be
set to protect the interests of minorities that object strongly to changes in
risk.'72 Negative covenants demanded by banks, or indenture terms de-
manded by bondholders to control risk may also reduce the cost of eq-
uity, because these provisions provide assurances to equity investors
about the limits on the level of firm risk.
2. Stockholder-Bondholder Conflicts
Firms with complex capital structures face other investor conflicts
over methods of financing. A new project financed entirely with debt can
increase the risk facing existing bondholders, while one financed entirely
171. See text at notes 16-18 supra.
172. For example, section 18(h) of the UNIF. PARTNERSHIP AcT requires unanimous consent of
partners to take any action in contravention of the partnership agreement. Authorizing new shares
in a corporation generally requires shareholder approval of an amendment to the corporate charter,
unless shareholders have previously delegated such decisions to the board by authorizing more
shares than were originally required to finance the firm.
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with equity can reduce it, even though the risk associated with the new
project is otherwise identical to that of other firm activities.173 Residual
claimants have incentives to increase the firm's exposure to risk (and the
potential for higher returns) at the expense of bondholders and other
creditors. 174
The contractual solutions to the stockholder-bondholder conflict are
well known. Specific constraints on investment policy may include
prohibitions of mergers, for example. Other provisions implicitly limit
investments, either by requiring earnings to provide minimum coverages
of debt service, or by providing bondholders with attractive contingent
claims on the upper tail of firm outcomes, through conversion privileges
and warrants. Scale economies and standardization of terms make these
provisions common in all debt issues of any size.17 -
Preferred stock provides investors with a less secure position than
bonds with respect to assurances of regular distributions. Normally
charter provisions and board resolutions creating preferred stock do not
contain covenants restricting risky activity. However, preferred holders
often obtain the right to elect directors when dividends fall in arrears, the
ultimate signal that the firm has chosen riskier projects than preferred
investors would like. 176
Other solutions prevail in some highly leveraged industries. Regula-
tion of public utilities may preclude risky choices, or protect debt claim-
ants at commercial banks. Protection of bank depositors against risky
shareholder choices is also subsidized through federal deposit insurance.
These claims are also protected by their relatively short term, which al-
lows depositors to withdraw fixed sums on short notice, if a bank engages
173. Smith & Warner, supra note 12, at 119; Easterbrook, supra note 36.
174. In a partnership, where all members are liable for firm debts, impecunious service partners
may have incentives to increase firm borrowings or engage in risky projects if they believe most of
the increased risk will be borne by other and wealthier partners. See, eg., W. KLEIN AND J. COF-
FEE, JR., supra note 22, at 89.
175. See generally Smith & Warner, supra note 12; but see McDaniel, supra note 49. McDaniel
concludes that Smith and Warner's description of the general nature of negative covenants may
mislead some readers, because a substantial number of the indentures he examined contained only
some of the possible negative covenants. See also Malitz, On Financial Contracting: The Determi-
nants of Bond Covenants, 15 FIN. MGT. 18 (1986) (43% contained no restrictions on dividends or
unsecured debt).
176. See, e.g., Baron v. Allied Artists Pictures Corp., 337 A.2d 653 (Del. Ch. 1975); and Elling-
wood v. Wolf's Head Refining Co., Inc., 27 Del. Ch. 356, 38 A.2d 743 (Del. 1944). MOYE, THE
LAW OF BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS, pp. 171-72 (1982).
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in riskier projects.17 7  Similar protection, in the form of withdrawable
capital, exists for some investors in investment banking firms. 1 78 Insur-
ance of customer accounts also provides protection for that class of credi-
tor least likely to monitor the riskiness of brokerage firm investments. 179
3. The Complication of a Dominant Investor
Even where the firm is financed entirely with residual claims, conflicts
can arise if a dominant investor is present. The firm now faces a single
demand for new projects, rather than a diversified demand, which may
result in unilaterally imposed changes in risk. When an investor obtains
this sort of dominance in a closely held firm, co-investors have virtually
no options, and can expect to suffer a one-time loss in personal utility.
Investors in close corporations can obtain some protection against
changes in the riskiness of their investments through one or more of the
following: a complex capital structure that issues debt claims; cumulative
voting plus supermajority voting on board decisions; or contractual
rights subject to buyout at a time of the investors' choosing.8 0 Alterna-
tively, investors can avoid the development of a dominant block, through
share transfer restrictions.
In publicly held firms a dominant investor can unilaterally change the
riskiness of firm projects only at the price of higher capital costs. A dom-
inant investor who anticipates a need to raise capital in the securities
markets in the future may thus choose to continue consistent investment
policies. A dominant investor is only constrained, however, to the extent
that he cannot self-finance firm expansion, either through retained earn-
ings or by going to the capital markets himself rather than through the
firm.
IV. WHY IS JOINT OWNERSHIP SO WIDESPREAD?
A review of the costs of joint ownership raises a question as to why
joint ownership is so widespread, especially in closely held firms where
177. The relationship between coordination costs and duration of investment is discussed supra
note 64 and infra text at notes 208-212.
178. See, eg., Exchange Nat'l Bank v. Touche, Ross & Co., 554 F.2d 1126 (2d Cir. 1976) (de-
scription of subordinated debt, callable by the creditor, that serves as capital to satisfy stock ex-
change and regulatory requirements).
179. SECURITIES INVESTOR PROTEION Acr of 1970, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 78aaa - 78111 (1981).
180. See, eg., Martin v. Peyton, 246 N.Y. 213, 158 N.E. 77 (1927) for an example of extensive
creditor controls over a debtor partnership.
[Vol. 65:1
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol65/iss1/2
INVESTOR COORDINATION COSTS
capital market forces do not operate to restrain shifts in firm policies, and
where dominance is either present or likely.
A. Scale Economies
Scale economies in many enterprises explain joint ownership. 81 In
many smaller enterprises all residual claims are held by a sole proprietor.
But even in these cases joint ownership often exists in the form of credi-
tor claims against the enterprise. Lenders may invest for the long term,
with elaborate contract protection in their loan agreements.182 Even
trade creditors provide a form of debt financing that gives them an inter-
est in the firm.18 Jensen and Meckling have fully described the relation-
ship between agency costs and firm size. A similar relationship should
hold for coordination costs, with the caveat that dispersed ownership
may itself reduce coordination costs through diversification. 84
B. Specialization and Complementary Skills
In personal service enterprises such as law and accounting firms, medi-
cal partnerships, or advertising agencies, a variety of specialized skills
may be required to offer the full range of services on the one-stop basis
that consumers prefer.185 Large firms reduce consumer search costs in
these instances, by providing larger liability and reputational bonds. Co-
ownership may be required to attract and retain highly skilled practition-
ers, who wish to be residual claimants on any rents that may be gener-
ated by their services.
C. Diversification and Liquidity
Where enterprises own large firm-specific assets, a sole owner can re-
duce risk by selling off investment units and diversifying his own portfo-
lio. The sale of such units may create an active market for the units and
provide additional liquidity for the owner, aside from the diversification
181. Jensen & Meckling, supra note 8, at 350-51; Demsetz, The Structure of Ownership and the
Theory of the Firm, 26 J. LAW & ECON. 375, 386 (1983).
182. See Smith & Warner, supra note 12.
183. Klein, The Modern Business Organization: Bargaining Under Constraints, 91 YALE L.J.
1521, 1527, text at note 21 (1982).
184. See text supra at notes 85-86.
185. Cf. Fama & Jensen, supra note 43, at 335 (describing large professional partnerships as
offering portfolios of specialized services and large bonds to protect clients from losses through mal-
feasance or incompetence).
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benefits. I" 6 Efficient securities markets are the ultimate product of that
process, which converts illiquid specific assets into marketable and ho-
mogeneous units.18 7
D. Outside Monitoring
Agency cost reductions may also explain the incurrence of some coor-
dination costs. Where shares of the firm are traded in efficient capital
markets, investors in the firm have purchased a new form of management
monitoring. Non-owners of the firm now have incentives to monitor
management, and to signal the firm's owners about declines in perform-
ance through declines in stock prices. 18 In some cases, these monitors
may choose to compete for the opportunity to manage the firm, by bid-
ding for a controlling block of shares, thus providing a solution to agency
cost problems not solved by other arrangements. In this sense, the ex-
isting owners free ride on the efforts of outside monitors.18 9
E. Deferral and Externalization of Costs
There may be many instances when investors have reached a clear con-
sensus on goals and policies for the firm at its inception. To the extent it
is unlikely that exogenous events will significantly alter their preferences
in the short run, the present value of coordination costs may be minimal,
and the most rational method to reduce present contracting expenses
may be to avoid them. Under these conditions, the present value of coor-
dination costs may not be significant.1 90 This does not mean that such
conflicts will not arise, or that their costs, when they do arise, will be
insignificant for these investors. It simply means that it was rational not
to expend resources contracting about them at the time of initial invest-
ment, because the present value of the marginal returns expected from
such contracting was lower than those available from alternative uses of
186. Cf G. ROBINSON & K. EPLER, GOING PUBLIC: SUCCESSFUL SECURITIES UNDERWRITING
6-7 (2d ed. 1978) and PAINTER, supra note 106, at 467.
187. Cf. Scholes, supra note 130.
188. Jensen & Meckling, supra note 8, at 354-55.
189. Id. at 355. In control battles, of course, attempts by firm shareholders to free ride on the
efforts of bidders may result in the underproduction of changes in control. Grossman & Hart,
Takeover Bids, the Free-Rider Problem, and the Theory of the Corporation, 1980 BELL. J. ECON. 42.
190. Achieving such relative investor peace for lengthy periods reduces the present value of the
coordination costs facing investors at the inception of the firm. Thus, in Figure 2, supra, this has the
effect of lowering the coordination cost curve (and thus the total cost curve) to reflect the discount to
present value.
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resources. Courts are frequently asked to resolve disputes when they
arise by reading implicit terms into an investment contract, when the
parties chose not to expend resources on writing them initially. To the
extent it provides such ex post terms, whether by statute or judicial im-
plication, the legal system subsidizes the failure to specify a fully contin-
gent contract.
F. Bounded Rationality
An extension of the present value analysis takes us to conditions of
uncertainty.191 Though efficient capital markets assure that all generally
recognized contingencies are appropriately discounted, and provide pres-
sure on firms to select optimal contractual arrangements to reduce these
expected costs, 192 no such assurance is present for closely held firms.19 3
Investors in closely held enterprises are likely to be subject to conditions
of bounded rationality, under which they either fail to perceive the com-
plete set of problems that may occur later, or underestimate the
191. Here I distinguish risk from Knightian uncertainty. F. KNIGHT, RISK, UNCERTAINTY
AND PROFIT, 19-21 (1921).
192. But see Gilson & Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 70 VA. L. REV. 549
(1984) (noting that markets may not respond immediately to innovations).
193. Assumptions about investor knowledge (at the margin) in efficient capital markets take
several forms. As one treatise states them:
The weak form [of the efficient market hypothesis] asserts that current prices fully reflect
the information implied by the historical sequence of prices. In other words, an investor
cannot enhance his ability to select stocks by knowing the history of successive prices and
the results of analyzing them in all possible ways. The semistrong form of the hypothesis
asserts that current prices fully reflect public knowledge about the underlying companies,
and that efforts to acquire and analyze this knowledge cannot be expected to produce supe-
rior investment results. The strong form asserts that not even those with privileged infor-
mation can often make use of it to secure superior investment results.
J. LORIE & M. HAMILTON, supra note 37, at 71.
Much work has been done to corroborate this hypothesis. See, eg., Fama, Efficient Capital Mar-
kets: A Review of Theory and Empirical Work, 25 J. FIN. 383 (1970); Friend, The Economic Conse-
quences of the Stock Market, 62 AM. ECON. REV. 212 (1972); Grossman, On the Efficiency of
Competitive Stock Markets Where Traders Have Diverse Information, 31 J. FIN. 573 (1976); Gordon
& Kornhauser, Efficient Markets, Costly Information, and Securities Research, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV.
761 (1986); and Comment, The Efficient Capital Market Hypothesis, Economic Theory and the Regu-
lation of the Securities Industry, 29 STAN. L. REV. 1031 (1977). Doubts remain about the hypothe-
sis, however. See Lowenstein, Pruning Deadwood in Hostile Takeovers: A Proposal for Legislation,
83 COLUM. L. REV. 249, 268-89 (1983) and Wang, Some Arguments that the Stock Market Is Not
Efficient, 19 U.C.D. L. REV. 341 (1986). The process of efficient selection does not demand that all
investors be equally knowledgeable about the lowest cost means of reducing such costs. It only
requires, as Alchian has pointed out, experimentation that allows successful experiments to survive
while others fail. Alchian, Uncertainty, Evolution and Economic Theory, 58 J. POL. EcON. 211
(1950).
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probability of their occurrence.'"4 The initial glow of enthusiasm for a
new business may prevent investors from reflecting fully upon these
problems. In all too many instances, their attorney may provide incom-
plete advice, whether from ignorance, cost considerations, or fear of
"queering the deal."19 It is hardly surprising to find courts more active
in resolving investor conflicts in closely held firms. 19 6
G. Appropriable Quasi-Rents
Klein, Crawford and Alchian have described how investment in spe-
cific assets creates appropriable quasi-rents in the specific asset. 197 These
authors concluded that creation of a firm was one means of solving the
specific assets problem. Here I have demonstrated that the problem does
not disappear with the creation of a firm, rather it merely assumes a new
form. That does not mean that the risks and costs associated with oppor-
tunistic behavior are not reduced. 98 Indeed, the survival principle sug-
gests that where firms own specific assets these costs are indeed
reduced. 199
V. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE OF FIRMS
A. Claimants on the Firm
The model of ownership structure suggested herein requires that we
think of all who invest capital in claims against the firm's assets, whether
human or financial, as owners of the firm. In addition to stockholders
194. The principle of bounded rationality has been defined as follows: "The capacity of the
human mind for formulating and solving complex problems is very small compared to the size of the
problems whose solution is required for objectively rational behavior in the real world." H. Simon,
Models of Man 198 (1957). See also E. MAcKAAY, ECONOMICS OF INFORMATION AND LAW 119-43
(1980); H. SIMON, THEORIES OF BOUNDED RATIONALITY, in DECISION AND ORGANIZATION 161-
76 (D. McGuire & R. Radner eds. 1972). These notions were anticipated by FRANK KNIGHT, in
RISK, UNCERTAINTY AND PROFIT 210-11 (1921). For a discussion of various applications of
bounded rationality with respect to investments in firms, see Carney, Defining A Security: The Addi-
tion of a Market-Oriented Contextual Approach to Investment Contract Analysis, 33 EMORY L.J. 311,
343-45 (1984).
195. W. KLEIN & J. COFFEE, JR., supra note 22, at 63-65.
196. Documenting this claim is a task best left to another paper.
197. Klein, Crawford & Alchian, supra note 27.
198. Rather, it means that there are diminishing marginal returns from using firms to replace
contract where investments in specific assets create appropriable quasi-rents, and one of the forces
diminishing these returns is the creation of another form of specific asset, an investment in a firm,
which creates separate appropriable quasi-rents, as well as other coordination costs.
199. Stigler, The Economies of Scale, I J. LAW & ECON. 54 (1958).
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and bondholders, agents who invest human capital in ways that create
appropriable quasi-rents must also be regarded as having a type of own-
ership claim, at least to the extent that it enables us to understand the
nature of the contracts they will prefer. Employees may be thought of as
such claimants, when employment decisions involve commitments to
firm specific human capital that cannot be fully salvaged in the event of
changes in firm behavior. Suppliers that make investments in specific
assets in anticipation of contracts with the firm have a form of ownership
claim, although it is clear that the law treats different classes of claimants
differently."2°  The important feature common to the entire group of
owners is their investment in specific assets that create quasi-rents, ap-
propriable under certain conditions by other claimants.
B. The Extent of Contracting
The existence of quasi-rents predicts that some forms of contracting
and bonding will be undertaken to assure investors in specific assets that
these quasi-rents will not be appropriated, or at least that the risk of
appropriation will be low. The extent of this contracting is influenced by
two factors: the extent and effectiveness of diversification, and the dura-
tion of claims against the firm.
1. Diversification
Where diversification provides a complete solution to investor con-
flicts, as in efficient capital markets, it is available at zero marginal cost,
since under most conditions it will be undertaken to avoid other risks.
Its protection against investor conflicts provides investors with a positive
externality. Thus firms with little prospect of a dominant investor should
not be expected to offer residual claimants significant contractual assur-
ances against policy shifts or opportunistic behavior. Under these condi-
200. Where holders of open residual claims obtain the protection of fiduciary duties in their
dealings with the firm and its managers, other claim holders are restricted to contract claims. See
generally Bratton, The Economics and Jurisprudence of Convertible Bonds, 1984 Wis. L. REv. 667,
668 (bondholders) and W. KLEIN & J. COFFEE, JR., supra note 22. One rationale for this, of course,
holds that firm managers can only owe full duties of loyalty to one constituency, and that the relative
specificity of other claimants' contracts makes it clear that they expect to be treated at arms' length
in their dealings with the firm. For a discussion of the complexities and the indeterminacy intro-
duced by notions of fiduciary duties to multiple constituencies in another corporate context, see
Schwartz, Defining the Corporate Objective: Section 2.01 of the ALI's Principles, 52 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 511 (1984). See also Williamson, Corporate Governance, 93 YALE L.J. 1197 (1984).
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tions preemptive rights should have little value.2" 1
We should expect to see costly contracting only to the extent that di-
versification does not provide a complete solution. The principal solu-
tions are likely to be designed to offer protection against wealth transfers
caused by opportunistic behavior that cannot be costlessly diversified
away. Bond indenture covenants and shark repellents are currently the
most visible of these contracts.2 °2 Holders of other claims obtain protec-
tion against the loss of expectancies, through call premiums on prema-
ture redemption of fixed claims, and adjustments of exercise rights on
highly contingent claims, such as convertibles and warrants.20 3
Closely held enterprises, where diversification is less likely to eliminate
all risk for investors, will make greater use of contract to reduce the cost
of expected investor conflicts. Transfer of investment units and issuance
of new units may be restricted by contract to assure greater homogeneity
of the investor group.2" Investor voting may be more widespread, with
more firm decisions left in the hands of investors.20 5 Protection against
dominance will be more extensive.
In partnerships this protection may be furnished by the "off-the-rack"
provisions of the Uniform Partnership Act, which provide for per capita
voting regardless of relative investments.20 6 In corporations it may be
provided by cumulative voting, which assures minority representation on
the board of directors, coupled with supermajority voting requirements,
both on the board and for shareholders. 07 The general absence of spe-
cific contract provisions prohibiting future firm actions demonstrates the
201. The studies of preemptive rights to date have not addressed this claim directly, although
Smith, Alternative Methods for Raising Capital, 5 J. FIN. ECON. 273 (1977), does suggest that a
monitoring cost reduction benefit exists, for foregoing direct or "rights" offerings to shareholders in
favor of underwritten offerings. But see, Hansen & Pinkerton, Direct Equity Financing: A Resolu-
tion of a Paradox, 37 J. FIN. 651 (1982) (rejecting the monitoring hypothesis and finding support for
flotation cost economies in underwritten offerings).
202. Smith & Warner, supra note 12 and Carney, Two-Tier Tender Offers, supra note 9.
203. Smith & Warner, supra note 12, at 140-143.
204. See text supra at notes 83 and 96.
205. Delaware's close corporation chapter, for example, permits charter amendments to shift all
firm management decisions to the shareholders, eliminating the board of directors entirely. DELA-
WARE GENERAL CORPORATION LAW, § 351, DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 351. See also MODEL
STATUTORY CLOSE CORPORATION SUPPLEMENT § 21, 3 MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT. ANN. 1836
(1985).
206. UNIF. PARTNERSHIP AcT § 18(h) (partnership questions decided by majority of the part-
ners unless otherwise provided).
207. See text supra at note 180.
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high cost of restricting the opportunity set available to the firm under
conditions of uncertainty.
2. Duration of Claims
The extent of costly contracting to reduce investor conflicts is also a
function of the duration of the particular claim. The longer the duration,
the greater the appropriable quasi-rents created, because more exogenous
events can influence firm decisions and co-investor choices.20 8 A brief
examination of debt claims against the firm illustrates the relationship.
Long-term corporate debt is usually issued only in connection with an
elaborate indenture, which explicitly restricts the opportunity set of in-
vestment and distribution choices available to the firm.209 Short-term
debt in many instances is the subject of only summary contracts, which
specify only dates of repayment and the consequences of a failure to re-
pay as scheduled.210 No attempts are made to restrict the debtor's in-
vestment and distribution policies, though the lender may obtain
assurances about the application of loan proceeds. Problems of wealth
transfers from the lenders to other classes of claimants on firm assets are
usually handled by reliance on general legal rules, under statutes dealing
211 T clwith fraudulent conveyances. If scale problems preclude complete
creditor investigation and specification of contract terms, regulation may
provide a substitute, as in the case of commerical and investment bank-
ing regulation, or deposit and customer account insurance.212
3. The Role of Liquidity
The foregoing discussion of the use of contract protections for credi-
tors is intended to demonstrate that the existence of a market for the
investment units does not determine whether appropriable quasi-rents
are created in the investment, nor the need for contract protection. Both
long-term corporate debt and commercial paper are issued and traded in
relatively efficient capital markets, so that liquidity is not a problem for
investors in either case. Yet the contract protections obtained in inden-
208, See supra text at note 64.
209. See AMERICAN BAR FOUNDATION, COMMENTARIES ON MODEL DEBENTURE INDENTURE
PROVISIONS (1971) and Smith & Warner, supra note 12.
210. See, eg., Developments in the Short-Term Securities Markets, and the Implications of Such
Developments under the Securities Acts, Appendix M, in 1 17TH ANN. INST. SEC. REG. 277 (Fried-
man et al., eds. 1985) (Form of Eurocommercial Paper).
211. See, e.g., UNIm. FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE ACT, 7A UNIF. L.A. 427 (1985).
212. See text at note 179 supra.
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tures covering long-term debt are far more elaborate than those gov-
erning commercial paper.213 The existence of efficient trading markets
only means that price adjustments for the creation of appropriable quasi-
rents will be instantaneous and incremental, rather than catastrophic
one-time events.214
C, The Special Difficulties of Residual Claims
Residual claims present the most difficult contracting questions, and as
a result contracts provide only a partial solution for conflicts in these
instances.215 Contracts among shareholders, for example, may be at least
partially substituted for by investor diversification into fixed as well as
residual claims of the same issuer, greater court intervention and by ex
ante compensation in the form of higher expected returns on
investments.
L Specification vs. Decision Rules
Where residual claims are concerned, writing a fully contingent con-
tract becomes prohibitively expensive, because the range of contingencies
is too great to permit bargaining over all possible events. Investors in
residual interests normally obtain their protection by deferring the cost
of deciding such issues until the event is highly probable, and it makes
economic sense to focus on it. Typically these events include decisions
about the liquidation of the firm or its sale to third parties. In a signifi-
cant numbeer of cases, decisions about major expansions will also be re-
served. Because more information will be available at a later date, the
chances of making a better decision are also improved.216 Nor are these
decisions delegated to agents. Investors generally reserve to themselves
the power to decide, though in some instances agents may have a veto
213. Compare AMERICAN BAR FOUNDATION, supra note 209 (governing long-term debt) with a
typical commercial paper issue's documentation, supra note 210. A recent and abbreviated form of
unsecured bond is found in Committee on Developments in Business Financing, ABA Section of
Corporation, Banking and Business Law, Model Simplified Indenture, 38 Bus. LAW 741 (1983).
214. The actual efficiency of bond and commercial paper markets is an empirical question on
which doubts exist. W. McDaniel, Bondlholders and Stockholders - CORP. L. REV. (forthcoming).
The issue is beyond the scope of this paper.
215. The other part of the solution is ex post settling up where neither party has specified out-
comes. Costs are recognized ex post rather than ex ante under these circumstances.
216. This is accomplished by limiting residual claims to those originally issued, unless expansion
is approved by amendment of the partnership agreement or the corporate charter. See, e.g., UNIF.
PARTNERSHIP ACT § 18(h) and REV. MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT § 10.03 (1984).
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power.2 17 Here restrictive decision rules, such as supermajority voting,
may be substituted for ex ante specification.218
2. Diversification of Claims Against the Firm
Investors in residual claims can reduce their risk of conflicts in ways
other than writing contracts expressly for these investors. The firm that
issues debt or preferred stock, for example, may make binding promises
to those who invest in those classes of securities that are desired by some
of the residual claimants as well. Indeed, in some cases these additional
classes will be issued for the express purpose of permitting residual inves-
tors to hold several classes of claims against the firm. Though it is not
uncommon for stockholders in closely held firms to hold debt or salary
claims, similar features also appear in publicly held firms, where some
stockholders obtain warrants, that provide them with further claims on
the upper tail of outcomes should risky ventures prove successful.
3. The Exit Option: Dissolution
Even if investments in firms create appropriable quasi-rents, realiza-
tion of salvage value depends on the ability to sell the specific asset. In
publicly held firms, the market offers the low-cost exit for investors.
Where no such market exists, we can expect the parties to provide for an
exit by contract.219 In default of such contract, the law generally pro-
vides an exit, though generally only under the most extreme circum-
stances, when aggregate welfare of the parties is threatened.22° Such an
approach eschews dissolving Kaldor-Hicks efficient firms, and generally
leaves the parties with the benefits and burdens of their bargain. The law
217. Typical statutes require shareholder votes to dissolve the firm e.g., Rev. Model Business
Corp. Act Ann. (1984) § 14.02, to sell all or substantially all assets not in the ordinary course of
business id., § 12.02 or to authorize new shares, which requires a charter amendment id., § 10.03. In
each instance, however, board approval is a prerequisite to a shareholder vote.
218. Partnership agreements may be amended only by unanimous consent in the absence of
contractual specification. See, e.g., UNIP. PARTNERSHIP ACT § 18(h).
219. See, eg., 2 O'NEAL, supra note 26 § 10.37 (buy-sell agreement between two shareholders);
Johnson, ed., BUY-OUTS AND BUSINESS PLANNING (Mich. Inst. Continuing Legal Educ., 1969) and
Hargrove, ed., BUSINESS BuY-OUT AGREEMENTS (Calif. Continuing Educ. of the Bar, 1976).
220. Historically, liquidation has been available at shareholder request only under limited cir-
cumstnaces. See, e.g., REV. MODEL BUSINESS CORP. AcT ANN. (1984) § 14.30(2) (allowing, but
not requiring, dissolution only where directors are deadlocked and "irreparable injury to the corpora-
tion is threatened or being suffered... ; [that] the directors or those in control of the corporation have
acted, are acting, or will act in a manner that is illegal, oppressive or fraudulent; [or] ... [that] the
shareholders are deadlocked in voting power ... [or that] the corporate assets are being misapplied
or wasted.")
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only intervenes when dissolution appears to be a Pareto superior move
because resources are being dissipated in disputes among co-owners.22'
4. Discounting for Investment Risk: Bounded Rationality
Only residual claims will be characterized by price differentials among
units of the same class, depending on the ownership of the units, because
it is only in residual claims that differential treatment among such units
is possible. In efficient capital markets the price of residual claims will
fully reflect non-diversifiable risk, and investors will be fully compen-
sated ex ante for that portion of the risk that has not been eliminated by
contract. No investor can credibly claim that he or she has been injured
by subsequent firm actions or the behavior of dominant investors or hold-
ers of a single class of the firm's securities.
Only where capital markets are not fully efficient and where investors'
rational expectations are limited by bounded rationality can we find con-
ditions where prices may not fully reflect expected coordination costs.
Closely held enterprises provide the most likely setting for the failure of
markets to generate the efficient set of contracts and prices for the invest-
ment units.222
5. The Role of Courts in Settling Up
When contracts have not resolved problems in advance, parties can
agree to settle up after the event. Settling up is likely to work only if the
parties expect to remain in a contracting relationship, and if the contin-
ued good will of the other party has value. When these conditions do not
exist, the absence of contract limitations will enable some co-investors to
take full advantage of their contract and property rights to disappoint the
expectations of other investors. In these circumstances investors who
purchased in efficient markets will have been fully compensated ex ante,
while those who did not buy in such markets may or may not have been
so compensated.
Residual claimants who find that their co-investors lack incentives to
settle up are the most likely class to seek judicial relief from disappoint-
ments created by an absence of contractual protections. Intervention is
unlikely to occur for those claimants with restricted sets of claims, absent
221. See, e.g., In re Radom & Neidorff, Inc., 307 N.Y. 1, 119 N.E.2d 563, declining to dissolve a
profitable business where a bitter dispute existed between the only two shareholders, a brother and
sister.
222. See, eg., Manne, Two Corporation Systems, supra note 68.
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outright theft or fraud.22 In such cases, the courts take the absence of
fully contingent contract protections as an express grant of property
rights to engage in any activities not prohibited. This analysis is gener-
ally extended to residual claims that are tied to fixed claims, such as
conversion rights, apparently on the theory that the number of contin-
gencies to be dealt with is finite, and can be dealt with efficiently by
contract.224
Typically, courts have exercised a limited role in providing ex post
settling up for residual claimants. But when residual claimants with
open contracts are in conflict, the courts have engaged in some interven-
tion. To a large extent firm decisions about distributions and risk have
been left to the parties, under the "business judgment rule. ' 2 25 It is only
when opportunistic behavior by dominant residual claimants is involved,
that American courts have intervened. They appear to have done so
without regard to whether the investment units were likely to be priced
in efficient markets, thus compensating the disappointed investors in ad-
vance. They have also done so without regard to the costs of judicial
restructuring, whether with respect to the costs of litigation or incentives
for future investors.
VI. CONCLUSION
The business enterprise is an awesomely complex social institution. It
is shaped by the nature of both agency and coordination costs. Its own-
ership structure represents an attempt to minimize both sets of costs.
Much work remains to be done to fully describe both sets of costs, and
the contract and institutional responses to them.
223. See Bratton, supra note 200, and cases cited at 682-83 (bondholders generally relegated to
their contract claims).
224. See, eg., Broad v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 642 F.2d 929.
225. See, eg., Sinclair, Oil corp. v. Lenvien, 280 A.2d 717 (Del. 1971), and Berwald v. Mission
Development Co., 40 Del. Ch. 509, 185 A.2d 480 (Del. 1962). But see Dodge Ford Motor Co., 204
Mich. 459, 170 N.W. 668 (1919).
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